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1Explaining Donald Trump’s Support: Cultural Lag or Cultural 
Backlash?
By 
Katherine Rocha, Chris Sabetta and Roger Clark
  Rhode Island College
INTRODUCTION
Asked why Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential 
election, pundits give about as many answers as there 
are, well, pundits . Answers include, for example, 
Comey’s announcement of the reopening of the Clinton 
investigation; Hillary Clinton’s poor candidacy; Mrs . 
Clinton’s e-mail scandal; Russian interference in the 
election process; the fact that Presidents are not elected 
by popular vote;  Trump’s supporters’ addiction to “The 
Apprentice;” and so on .
Although these answers may each have some validity, 
none is particularly sociological . And none feels like 
an adequate answer to the basic question: what made 
a sufficient slice of the American populace so ready 
and perhaps eager to vote for a political novice, with 
some evident peccadillos, that any of these peculiarities, 
or even some combination of them, could tip the 
scale? This really is the central question of this paper, 
one that we address through two lenses: a cultural lag 
lens and a cultural backlash lens . The former leads 
us to believe that support for Trump’s candidacy was 
born out of economic insecurity in a substantial part 
of the electorate . The latter, that it was the result of 
a resentment of a “silent revolution” in attitudes, a 
revolution that deprived many whites of their sense of 
privilege in American society .
Abstract
The authors employ Ogburn’s (1922) concept of cultural lag to gain insight into why Donald Trump’s supporters 
voted for him in the 2016 Presidential election .  Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark posit that economic and technological 
changes created a sense of ill being, or malaise, among a large portion of the white working class and that this 
malaise made voters unusually susceptible to the populist themes of the Trump candidacy .  The authors analyze 
Gallup’s (2017) “State of the States” poll results for 2016 to examine the degree to which Trump’s margin of victory 
over Clinton in the 50 states (data from The Cook Political Report 2017) can be explained by the variables of 1) 
the percentage of state residents who identify as Republican or who identify as independent but say they lean 
Republican and 2) a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being” index .” This index is comprised of five elements 
of well-being that are the core components of the best possible life: purpose, social, financial, community and 
physical .” The authors report that, at the state level, once the degree to which a population identified as Republican 
was controlled, there was a strong, negative correlation between its overall well being and Trump’s electoral 
margins . Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark use the American National Election study data from 2016 and 2012, at the 
individual level, to show that the 2016 election was unusually influenced by attitudes that constituted a kind of 
cultural backlash to progressive viewpoints about blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, and women .  The data 
show that these attitudes had stronger controlled associations with a vote for Trump than measures of current 
economic and educational deprivation .
Keywords: cultural lag, economic insecurity, cultural backlash, populism
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Using the “Cultural Lag” Lens
We thought that the theme of this issue of SBG, 
cultural lag, might hold the clue to Donald Trump’s 
electoral success .  We knew that at least one faction 
of Trump supporters (e .g ., white working-class men 
and their families) had experienced a buffeting by the 
winds of economic and technological change . While 
such changes also affected working-class people of 
other racial and ethnic backgrounds, white working-
class men and their families were more susceptible to 
Trump’s campaign themes about job creation and job 
security .  
The sources of this buffeting have been well 
documented . By the 1960s, in fact, the switch to 
a knowledge-based economy in the United States 
had begun and the industrial economy began to 
thin . Managers and engineers, always interested in 
increasing productivity, produced automated factories 
that employed fewer people . By the 1970s, corporations 
began to replace old factories with new ones in countries 
with low-cost labor . Initially this loss of manufacturing 
jobs hit black men hardest, but by the 1980s the losses 
hit less-educated whites as well (Kenschaft, Clark and 
Ciambrone 2016: 41-42) .  The more recent acceleration 
of computing power, what Thomas Friedman (2016) calls 
“the supernova,” promises to threaten the traditional 
working-class job market even more .
The effects of all this economic and technological 
change have been uneven in the United States, as 
elsewhere .  Real family incomes for the top 20 percent 
of families rose by a little over 75 percent between 1967 
and 2013 . Meanwhile those for the next 40 percent 
rose by less than 30 percent, and have actually fallen 
substantially since 2000, and those for the next 40 
percent have risen much less, and also fallen since 2000 
(Reeves 2015) .  Social scientists as politically disparate as 
Charles Murray (2012) and Robert Putnam (2015) have 
pointed to an increasing bifurcation in the experiences, 
opportunities, and prospects for children between what 
Murray calls “The New Upper Class” and the “New 
Lower Class .”  Murray demonstrates convincingly that 
this divide is as significant among white Americans as it 
is among any other group .  
The relationship between the income inequality 
and opportunity inequality has not been simple or 
instantaneous . Murray (2012) and Putnam (2015) both 
suggest that it took decades for economic troubles 
“to undermine family structures and community 
supports” (Putnam 2015: 228) . As marriage became less 
common and divorce more common among the “new 
lower class,” children experienced gaps in parenting, 
developing lower commitments to education and lower 
chances for intergenerational mobility .  Fear regarding 
and resentment for these situations was natural, as 
well as for government actors who continued, as one 
of Hochschild’s (2016: 52)) respondents put it, “come 
down on the little guy,” over-regulating the little guy, but 
under-regulating guys at the top .
 In his 2015 book, Our Kids: The American Dream 
in Crisis, Putnam under-scored the potential for 
“antidemocratic extremism” that the presence of a 
new lower class, faced increasingly with few personal 
opportunities, but also few opportunities for their 
children, poses .  As he put it:
[U]nder severe economic and international pressures  .  . 
 . the “inert” mass might suddenly prove highly volatile and 
open to manipulation by anti-democratic demagogues at the 
ideological extremes (pp . 239-240) .
So one view of Trump’s victory suggests that 
many of his supporters were victims of long-term 
economic upheaval in the U . S ., seeking to express 
their dissatisfaction with the way the country had 
left them and their children behind . They voted for 
Trump, according to this view, because he spoke to 
their economic insecurities and promised to create 
the jobs that would enable them to once again achieve 
respectable middle-class status for themselves and a 
hopeful future for their children . An added benefit 
was that Donald Trump promised to shake up the 
Washington establishment .  
More generally, Donald Trump has been viewed as 
embodying the characteristics of a populist candidate, 
one who extols the wisdom of “ordinary people” ahead 
of the views of elites (e .g ., media pundits and elected 
politicians) . Populism, according to Inglehart and 
Norris (2016: 6-7) is a philosophy that often favors 
the personal power of charismatic leaders, preferring 
direct majoritarian democratic rule over a system of 
checks and balances .  Donald Trump’s embrace of these 
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principles, the cultural lag perspective implies, made 
him particularly attractive to people with less education, 
lower levels of income and wealth, and a greater sense 
that the economy was failing because it promised to 
address their economic insecurities .  
Therefore, the cultural lag perspective led us to 
propose the following four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: People with lower incomes would have 
been more likely to vote  for Trump than people with higher 
incomes .
Hypothesis 2: People with less wealth would have been 
more likely to vote for Trump than people with more wealth .
Hypothesis 3: People with less education would have 
been more likely to vote  for Trump than people with more 
education .
Hypothesis 4:  People who felt the economy was doing 
badly would have been more likely to vote for Trump than 
people who felt the economy was doing  well .
 Using the “Cultural Backlash” Lens 
“Cultural backlash” refers to a reaction against 
progressive cultural movements . The cultural backlash 
perspective can be seen as focusing on second-level, 
attitudinal implications of economic and technological 
change, especially for people who may previously 
have seen themselves as privileged in society, but now 
feel victimized by liberal movements and attitudes . 
This perspective suggests that there has been a “silent 
revolution” in values in many Western nations, 
coinciding with the rise of knowledge-based economies 
(e .g ., Inglehart 1977), that has been associated with a 
rise of multiculturalism, advocacy for environmental 
protection, human rights, and gender equality . Like 
many such “revolutions,” this one has inspired a 
backlash most particularly among those who have seen 
their privilege and status challenged by liberals and by 
economic change . These revolutions have left many 
whites feeling, as Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) book title 
states, Strangers in Their Own Land .
Hochschild’s qualitative research into the lives and 
convictions of conservatives, who, in her study, were 
largely white, uncovers deep-seated fears of being 
culturally eclipsed .  Her Louisiana respondents did in 
fact fear economic decline, but were conceivably even 
more motivated by resentments about “line cutters,” 
groups who seem, through affirmative action programs 
of the federal government, to have been given a leg up 
in colleges and universities, jobs and welfare programs . 
Hochschild summarizes:
Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers—
where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal 
sympathy sieve you don’t control or agree with . These are 
opportunities you’d have loved to have had in your day—and 
either you should have had them when you were young or 
the young shouldn’t be getting them now .  It’s not fair (2016: 
137) .
Hochschild is careful about labeling her respondents, 
and by extension other, primarily white, conservatives, 
as racist, sexist, anti-immigrant or homophobic .  Many, 
she implies, probably are racist by definitions used by 
sociologists—e .g ., believers “in a natural hierarchy that 
places blacks at the bottom” (2016: 147) .  She points out, 
however, that most are explicitly not racist by their own 
definitions of the word—people who use the “N” word 
or who hate blacks .  We too would like to avoid such 
labels .
Donald Trump spoke to the sense of unfairness felt 
by many “new lower class” whites .  He openly criticized 
immigrants from Mexico and Muslim countries, and 
was cheered . Openly demanded that “Black Lives 
Matter” protesters be kicked out of his rallies, and 
garnered vocal crowd support . Hochschild makes this 
observation about a rally she observed:
He [Trump] was throwing off not only a set of “politically 
correct” attitudes, but a set of feeling rules—that is, a set of 
ideas about the right way to feel regarding blacks, women, 
immigrants, gays  .  .  . (2016: 227) .
  
The cultural backlash perspective led us to propose a 
number of other hypotheses about the 2016 presidential 
election . Specifically, we came to expect:
Hypothesis 5: People who feel that blacks have not been 
particularly disadvantaged are more likely than others to 
have voted for Trump .
Hypothesis 6: People who would like to halt immigration 
into the country are more likely than others to have voted for 
Trump .
Hypothesis 7: People who feel that discrimination against 
gays and lesbians is tolerable are more likely than others to 
have voted for Trump .
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Hypothesis 8: People who feel that discrimination against 
women is tolerable are more likely to have voted for Trump 
than others .
Our reading of the cultural lag and cultural backlash 
perspectives together led us to believe that, at the state 
level, those state populations expressing the greatest 
overall well being would be less likely to vote for Trump 
than those expressing the least overall well being . 
Hence, we proposed our last (ninth) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: At the state level, Trump’s margin of 
victory will have been inversely related to the proportion 
of the population expressing a sense of overall well being, 
even once the proportion of the population of the population 
classifying itself as Republican is controlled .
RESEARCH APPROACH and PRINCIPAL 
VARIABLES
This article is based primarily on secondary analysis 
of two timely data sets: Gallup’s (2017) “State of the 
States” poll results for 2016 and the American National 
Election Study (ANES) for 2016 and 2012 .1  We use the 
Gallup data to determine the degree to which Trump’s 
margin of victory (or defeat) over Clinton in the 50 
states (data from The Cook Political Report, 2017) can 
be explained by two variables: the percentage of state 
residents who identify as Republican or who identify 
as independent but say they lean toward Republican 
and a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being” 
index, “made up of five elements of well-being that are 
the core components of the best possible life: purpose, 
social, financial, community and physical .”  Our goal 
is to ascertain the degree to which a lack of “well-
being,” the closest measure of state-wide despair we 
have found, can account for Trump’s success, above and 
beyond what could have expected based on the political 
identification of states’ populations .
Since 1948, ANES has employed a sample of 
American voters in every presidential election in order 
to help researchers determine the characteristics and 
attitudes of voters that led to the election result in 
each presidential election .  We use the ANES data to 
determine how various indicators of voter economic 
insecurity and cultural backlash, at the individual, 
1 The ANES data were available through Berkeley University’s 
(2017) “Survey Documentation and Analysis” website.
rather than at the state, level may have contributed to 
Trump’s electoral success . We choose indicators based 
on their availability in both the 2012 presidential 
election, involving primarily Mitt Romney and Barack 
Obama and in order to estimate their relative salience 
in the 2016 election .  Comparing the two elections is 
crucial for determining the degree to which certain 
characteristics and attitudes stand out in the 2016 
election . Thus, for instance, even if we find that a 
concern about immigrants distinguished Trump voters 
from Clinton voters, we cannot be sure that this attitude 
was particularly salient in the 2016 election unless we 
can determine that it was less important in previous 
elections .
Our dependent variable in the 2016 election is 
whether a respondent voted for Clinton (coded 0) or 
Trump (coded 1) .  Our dependent variable in the 2012 
election is whether s/he voted for Obama (coded 0) or 
Romney (coded 1) .
We use four measures of economic status and possible 
insecurity as independent variables . Three of these tap 
respondents’ economic condition and the fourth, an 
attitude towards the economy .  The first independent 
variable is a measure of family income (INCOME) .2 
The second independent variable is a rough measure 
of wealth, based on whether a respondent claimed to 
own stock or not (STOCK) . The third independent 
variable is a measure of education (EDUCATION) .3  The 
fourth independent variable is a measure of economic 
condition (ECONOMY) .4  The cultural lag perspective 
leads us to expect that people with lower family income, 
without stocks, with less education and with negative 
ratings of the economy are more likely to have voted for 
Trump than people with higher incomes, with stocks, 
with more education and with positive ratings of the 
economy .
We also have four measures of the degree to which 
respondents are gripped by a negative reaction to 
progressive value changes—that is, are part of a cultural 
2 INCOME has 28 categories, ranging from “under $5,000” to 
“$250,000 or more.”
3 EDUCATION has five categories, ranging from “less than a high 
school credential” to “a graduate degree.”
4 ECONOMY is operationalized by a respondent’s rating of the 
economy on a five-category scale from “very good” to “very bad.”
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backlash against certain categories of people .  One 
measure has to do with the degree to which they disagree 
with the statement that “Blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve” (BLACKS) .  A second measure focuses 
on the degree to which they think the media should 
pay less attention to discrimination against women 
(WOMEN) .5  A third measure is whether they say “no” 
to the question “should laws protect gays and lesbians 
from job discrimination” (GAYS) . And the fourth 
measure, a four-category scale measuring the degree 
to which respondents think that government should 
define unauthorized immigrants as felons and send 
them back to their home countries (IMMIGRANTS) . 
Unfortunately, in regard to measuring anti-immigrant 
feeling, this last variable does not have the greatest 
face validity in the 2016 ANES survey . An alternative 
measure of this variable was available in the 2016 . We 
could not use the alternative variable because there was 
no comparable indicator present in the 2012 survey .6 
However, analyses not presented here suggest that the 
more valid, alternative measure of anti-immigrant 
feeling actually shows a stronger association with 
presidential choice than IMMIGRANT, so using the 
variable IMMIGRANT in our analysis probably offers 
a conservative estimate of the degree to which anti-
immigrant sentiment drove Trump voters .
We use five control variables in our analyses: political 
party affiliation; race; gender; age; and the importance 
of religion to the respondent .7 Republicans were 
undoubtedly more likely to vote for Trump than voters 
with other political identifications .8 We expected that 
5 We want to point out that the wording of this statement may 
needlessly confuse voter attitudes towards women with their 
attitudes towards the media as well as their attitudes towards 
Hillary Clinton, a female candidate.  However, we found no more 
reliable indicator of attitudes towards women in the 2016 and 2012
6 One variable (available in 2016), based on a question about what 
should happen to United States immigration levels (from “increase 
them a lot” to “decrease them a lot”) does not confuse, as the 
variable IMMIGRANTS might be seen to do, attitudes towards 
immigration with attitudes towards illegal immigration. 
7 Political party affiliation is coded as Republican = 1 and not 
Republican = 0. Self-identified race is coded as 1 = white and 0 = 
not white. Gender (GENDER) is coded as 1 = female and 0 = male. 
Age (AGE) is coded as age in years; and the importance of religion 
to the respondent (RELIGION) is coded as 1 = religion important 
and 0 = religion not important.  
Republicans, whites, males, older voters, and people 
who said religion was important would be more likely 
to vote for Trump than non-Republicans, non-whites, 
females, younger voters and people who said religion 
was not important .
RESULTS
We report results from Pearson correlation and 
linear regression analyses for overwhelming theoretical 
considerations, despite the fact that many of our 
variables do not meet the assumptions required of such 
statistical techniques .9  Normally, it would be preferable 
to use logit or probit regression analysis, for instance, 
when the dependent variable is dichotomous, especially 
when one of the categories of the variable is relatively 
rare . But rarity is not a problem for the dependent 
variables in this analysis: all four candidates—Trump, 
Clinton, Romney and Obama—received substantial 
proportions of the votes .  And simple linear regression 
provides statistics—in this case, standardized regression 
coefficients (betas)—that enable the comparison of 
the strength of controlled associations of various 
independent variables on the dependent variable . These 
are crucial comparisons for this study .  In analyses not 
reported in this paper, we have done logit regression 
and find that results are stable over the two types of 
regression regime (i .e ., for simple linear and logit 
regression) .
Our initial research question had to do with how 
much of Trump’s margins at the state level, which is, 
after all, how elections are decided, could be accounted 
for in terms of general malaise, dissatisfaction or 
despair among the electorate .  We therefore regressed 
Trump’s margin at the state level on two variables: 
one, the percentage of state residents self-identifying 
as Republican; the other, the index measuring overall 
wellbeing . As Table 1 suggests, once the percentage 
8 We had a choice between two variables: one measured the 
degree to which voters considered themselves Republican (with 
strong Republicans being on one end of a 7-category scale and 
strong Democrats being on the other); one measured whether they 
identified as Republican or not.  As it turns out, findings do not 
substantially differ when either indicator is used, but we use the 
latter in the analyses presented here.
9 Quite a few of the variables we analyze are not measured at the 
interval level and those that are, even our dependent variable, 
the candidate for whom people voted, are typically two-category 
dummy variables.
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of Republicans is controlled, the association between 
Trump’s margin and index of overall wellbeing was 
strong, significant and negative (beta = - .19) . (See 
Table1 .)
Table 1. Regression of Trump Margin by State on 
the Percentage of the State Population Reporting 
That It Is Republican (REPUBLICAN) and Overall 
Wellbeing Index (WELLBEING)
Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
REPUBLICAN      .91***
WELLBEING                - .19***
N of States             50
Adjusted R-square             .92
However, if “ill being,” the opposite of “well being,” 
was a significant predictor of Trump’s margin of victory 
at the state level, the question arises as to what was the 
nature of this “ill being” at the individual level . The 
cultural lag and the cultural backlash perspectives on 
support for populism provide three testable hypotheses . 
Table 2 shows fundamental support, even while it also 
reveals some surprises . We begin with our control 
variables in the regression analyses presented here . 
Comparison between the 2016 and 2012 elections 
suggests that, at the zero-order level, REPUBLICAN (r 
in 2016 =  .61; r in 2012 =  .64) was slightly less salient in 
the 2016 than in the 2012 election . Race, gender and age 
had about the same salience in the 2016 election as they 
did in the 2012 election .  But the importance of religion 
to a voter was actually considerably more salient in the 
2016 election (r =  .26) than it was in 2012 (r =  .11) . 
People who defined themselves as religious were much 
more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton . They were 
even more likely to do that than religious voters were to 
vote for Romney than Obama .  
Table 2 also offers support for hypotheses derived 
from the cultural lag perspective . However, this support 
is sometimes only evident when one contrasts the 
2016 results with the 2012 results . Thus, the negligible 
correlation between INCOME and a vote for Trump 
in 2016 (r = .01) would not immediately support the 
hypothesis that income affected the 2016 result, if it 
were not for the fact that, by contrast, Romney voters 
tended to have considerably more income than Obama 
voters (r = .14) .  As a general rule, Republicans tend to 
be higher earners than Democrats . The 2016 election 
proved to be the rule’s exception, suggesting that many 
income-strapped voters did in fact vote for Trump . 
Similarly, voters without a stock portfolio were only a 
little more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton in the 
2016 election (r for STOCKS = - .07), but, compared to 
the non-existent relationship in the 2012 election (r = 
 .00), this difference suggests that Trump’s candidacy was 
relatively effective at drawing voters with little wealth .
The other two hypotheses derived from the cultural 
lag perspective are also supported, but, in this case, the 
support is somewhat undermined by the comparison 
with 2012 results .  It is widely believed, for instance, 
that less educated voters were more likely to vote for 
Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between 
EDUCATION and a Trump vote (r = - .12) supports 
this belief .  But the fact that the correlation between 
EDUCATION and a Romney vote was stronger (r = 
- .16) suggests that education may not have been quite 
as telling in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 
election .  It is also a common belief that those who felt 
the economy was doing badly were more likely to vote 
for Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between 
ECONOMY and a Trump vote (r =  .48) would appear 
to be strong support for this view . But, when one 
sees that the correlation between a Romney vote and 
ECONOMY in 2012 was even stronger (r =  .58), one 
is led to entertain the possibility that disappointment 
with the economy’s performance does not completely 
explain Trump’s success, or at least was not as salient a 
factor in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 election .
 In contrast, the correlation coefficients reported in 
Table 2 show both absolute and relative support for all 
of the hypotheses derived from the cultural backlash 
perspective . BLACKS, measuring the extent to which 
voters disagreed with the statement that “Blacks have 
gotten less than they deserve,” was strongly correlated 
with voting for Trump (r =  .54), even more strongly 
than it was with votes for Romney when he was running 
against a black incumbent whom some Americans 
resented (r =  .47) . Voting for Trump was more highly 
correlated with disagreement with the feeling that gays 
and lesbians should not be discriminated against (r = 
 .30) than voting for Romney was ( .25), even though, in 
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both cases, the correlation is relatively high .  Negative 
feelings about undocumented immigrants was much 
more strongly correlated with a vote for Trump (r= .44) 
than it was with a vote for Romney ( .28), though in 
neither case was the correlation weak .  And negative 
feelings about media attention to discrimination against 
women was much more strongly associated with a vote 
for Trump ( .49) than it was with a vote for Romney 
( .35), although, again, in both cases the correlation is 
strikingly high . (See Table 2 .)
It is, of course, possible that some of the insights 
available from Table 2 would require modification when 
we examine the associations of independent variables 
with voting behavior, controlling for other variables . 
Table 3 presents the results of regression analyses and, in 
fact, it suggests that some of the insights provided by the 
correlation analyses do need to be reconsidered . Thus, 
for instance, when all other variables are controlled, 
voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic 
candidate in both the 2016 and the 2012 elections if 
religion was important to them (beta for 2016 = - .09, 
for 2012 = - .12) .
Crucially, though, the regression analyses continue 
to provide solid support for the cultural backlash 
hypotheses, while they provide more ambiguous support 
for the cultural lag hypotheses .  Thus, the 2016 betas for 
BLACKS, IMMIGRANTS, GAYS, and WOMEN ( .17, 
 .12,  .06 and  .16, respectively) are all stronger than their 
counterparts in 2012 ( .15,  .08,  .00, and  .08, respectively) 
and statistically significant . Trump voters seem to have 
been unusually unsympathetic to the condition of 
blacks, undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, 
and women .  
On the other hand, support for the cultural lag 
hypotheses is less strong in the regression analyses than 
it appeared to be in the correlation analyses . None of the 
betas for INCOME, STOCKS, and EDUCATION ( .00, 
- .01, and - .02, respectively) is statistically significant, 
and only the one for INCOME suggests much more 
relative economic deprivation among Trump voters than 
its counterpart (beta =  .05) for the 2012 election .  The 
beta for ECONOMY ( .20) in the 2016 election strongly 
suggests that Trump voters felt more disappointment 
over the economy’s performance than Clinton voters 
did, but it also suggests less relative disappointment 
than its counterpart (beta =  .30) does for Romney 
voters, compared to Obama voters, in the 2012 election . 
(See Table 3 .)
DISCUSSION
We find evidence that voting for Trump in the 2016 
election may have been substantially motivated by 
sentiments resulting from economic and technological 
changes that have gotten ahead of American society’s 
ability to adapt—i .e ., from cultural lag . We argue that 
the long-term disruption of the job market for the 
working class, especially the white working class, has left 
a considerable portion of the American electorate with 
a sense of malaise . Moreover, our state-level analysis 
suggests that this malaise, this feeling of ill being, was a 
strong correlate of Trump’s margins .
Our individual-level analyses suggest support for 
the notion that Trump’s success had more to do with 
resentments that may have been fostered by economic 
disruption than by lingering economic disadvantages 
themselves .  In terms of income and stockholdings, for 
instance, Trump voters were not different from Clinton 
voters, although their relative economic disadvantage, 
compared to Romney voters in 2012, is notable . 
Relatively speaking, they were slightly less educated 
than Romney voters, but not significantly less educated 
than Clinton voters, when other variables in our analysis 
were controlled . They were much more likely than 
Clinton voters to see the economy as worse off than it 
was the previous year, but, compared to Romney voters 
in 2012, they were not quite as adamant on this point .
We want to point to limitations of our study, 
however, that make suspect its apparent negligible to 
weak support for the view that Trump supporters have 
been more disadvantaged by economic upheaval than 
Clinton supporters . First, and perhaps most important, 
we have no data about the past workplace experiences of 
voters in the 2016 .  We cannot say, as a result, what kind 
of dislocations voters may have experienced during the 
Great Recession of 2008/2009, or over the past forty 
or fifty years—and, hence, how these dislocations may 
have been related to their vote in the 2016 Presidential 
election .  Second, we do not have access to data about 
whether voters were unemployed or non-participants 
in the labor force—both better indicators of current 
economic insecurity than any measures we were able to 
employ .  Third, our finding of little difference between 
Trump and Clinton voters in terms of income, wealth 
and education is actually fairly striking, given the 
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Table 2.  Correlates of Trump and Romney Votes
Trump/Clinton       Romney/Obama 
                                 2016                          2012
REPUBLICAN                  .61***              .64***
WHITE       .33***              .34***
GENDER    - .06**                       - .07***
AGE                    .13***              .11***
RELIGION                   .26***              .11***
INCOME                   .01               .14***
STOCKS     - .07***               .00
EDUCATION     - .12***           - .16***
ECONOMY       .48***              .58***
BLACKS         .54***              .47***
IMMIGRANTS      .44***              .28***
GAYS        .30***              .25***  
  
WOMEN       .49***              .35***
Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 = 
1,860 . An * indicates significance at the  .05 level; A ** indicates 
significance at the  .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the 
 .001 level . Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1=Republican;  0 = not 
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white;  0 = non-white; GENDER: 
1= female ; 0=male; RELIGION: 1= religion important; 0 = 
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks;  0 = owns no 
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that 
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater 
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more 
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are 
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates 
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should 
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher 
values indicate greater agreement with feeling that media 
should pay less attention to discrimination against women .
Table 3.  Regression of Trump and Romney Votes on 
Other Variables
             Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
           Trump/Clinton           Romney/Obama
                                               2016                             2012
REPUBLICAN           .33***   .35***
WHITE           .14***   .16***
GENDER    - .02               - .03
AGE        .03*                 .02
RELIGION     - .09***               - .12***
INCOME        .00     .05**
STOCKS     - .01                - .04*
EDUCATION     - .02     .01
ECONOMY        .20***   .30***
BLACKS       .17***    .15***
IMMIGRANTS            .12***   .08***
GAYS        .06***   .00
WOMEN       .16***   .08***
N       2211   1844
Adjusted R-square      .61    .61
Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 = 
1,860 .  An * indicates significance at the  .05 level; A ** indicates 
significance at the  .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the 
 .001 level .  Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1= Republican;  0 = not 
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white;  0 = non-white; GENDER: 
1= female ; 0 = male; RELIGION: 1 = religion important; 0 = 
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks;  0 = owns no 
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that 
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater 
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more 
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are 
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates 
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should 
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher values 
indicate greater agreement with feeling that media should pay 
less attention to discrimination against women .
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historic tendency of Republicans to be richer and better 
educated than Democrats . It may actually mean that 
more of the poorer and less-educated voters voted for 
Trump than typically vote for Republican candidates . 
Nonetheless, to the extent that our indicators do tap 
the current economic conditions of voters, we can say 
that we were unable to turn up much evidence that 
those conditions did much to distinguish Trump from 
Clinton voters .
What we did find considerable evidence for is 
the view that Trump voters were more likely to 
express resentments, conceivably resulting from past 
economic challenges, about various minority and/or 
marginalized groups than Clinton voters . This has been 
true of supporters of previous Republican candidates, 
compared to those of their Democratic opponents, as 
our data on the 2012 election affirm .  But the differences 
between the 2016 and 2012 elections suggest that 
Trump voters were unusually likely to have negative 
attitudes towards blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, 
and women, even compared to Republican-candidate 
supporters in previous elections .  While we cannot say 
for sure that it was only white voters for Trump who 
had these attitudes, the results do constitute support 
for Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) general contention that 
Trump voters felt resentment towards groups that made 
them feel like “strangers in their own land .”  
CONCLUSION
In general, using the cultural lag perspective, we find 
relatively little support for the contention that Trump 
voters were distinguished from Clinton voters in terms 
of their economic or educational levels .  We find more 
support for the conclusion, also derived from the 
cultural lag perspective, that they were distinguished 
by a relatively bleak view of the economy . However, 
we were surprised to see that their bleak view of the 
economy did less to distinguish them from Clinton 
voters than it did to distinguish Romney from Obama 
voters in the 2012 election .  Future research, however, 
might examine the question of whether Trump voters 
have experienced more economic and/or educational 
deprivation sometime in their past than Clinton 
voters .  Such research might provide a truer test of the 
cultural lag perspective than we were able to achieve in 
our analysis, limited as we were to measures of voters’ 
current economic and educational situations .
We find more evidence for hypotheses based upon the 
cultural backlash perspective .  Trump voters expressed 
greater resentments about blacks, immigrants, women 
and gays and lesbians than did Clinton voters and 
these differences were considerably greater than similar 
ones that distinguished voters in the 2012 presidential 
election .  Unfortunately, the data we analyzed cannot 
help us discern whether these resentments would have 
been detectable before the Trump candidacy or whether 
the Trump candidacy was a necessary condition for 
such resentments becoming notable and noted . 
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The Advent of Autonomous Vehicles:  A Transportation Revolution
     
By
         
Helmut E. Reinhardt
INTRODUCTION
Along with trucks and buses, the automobile has 
been one of the most useful inventions of the twentieth 
century . These vehicles have contributed to the economic 
growth of the U .S . (and every other country in the 
world) and have affected the lifestyles of people globally, 
including our geographic mobility and independence . 
Without them, our lives would be only local or regional . 
This article focuses on the revolution in vehicles that 
has been going with increasing frequency in the second 
decade of the 21st century . This article also focuses on 
people’s responses to the dramatic changes in today’s 
vehicles and in the projected changes in vehicles in the 
coming years .  Finally, it explores the gap between the 
speed at which the transportation revolution is taking 
place and the ability of drivers of various ages to adapt 
to these changes .
To place this article in context: I have been a volunteer 
driver safety instructor for AARP for the past thirteen 
years . I have seen many changes in the curriculum of 
the course along with the advent of  semi-autonomous 
vehicles and the start of autonomous vehicles . When 
I first started leading the course (one talks about the 
students as participants; instructors do not teach, we 
lead the discussions with senior drivers over 55 years 
of age), our course consisted of one small VCR tape of 
20 minutes in length and a small manual . The course 
was two days; four hours each day . The instructors were 
not assisted by computers back then (circa 2004) . Each 
instructor had to upgrade to new computer skills and 
read articles on the newest innovations in vehicles .
Over the years, the course morphed into one four and 
one half hour program, which includes an hour-long 
DVD presentation on selected topics .  The content of 
the course now includes many topics not presented 13 
years previously-- for example, technological advances, 
such as park and first lane assist; backup cameras for 
rear vision; blind spot detection; advanced cruise 
control; sensors for crash avoidance and automatic 
high/low beams and smart headlights (lights that turn 
with the direction of the vehicle) .  Vehicles now offer 
mood lighting, heated and vibrating seats, an entire 
dashboard information panel for temperature control, 
satellite radio, weather reports to assist drivers in any 
weather condition, GPS systems (including maps), and 
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sensors for drowsy drivers, which warn the driver that 
he/she is falling asleep, and lane changing sensors along 
with warnings for drifting from lanes (AARP Smart 
Driver Course Guidebook 2014: 27-29) .   
 
Every year cars and trucks change . The latest changes 
include different types of engines and fuel requirements 
for operation (e .g ., biodiesel, natural gas, electric, 
ethanol, waste oil, and even fuel cell) .  In 2018, United 
Parcel Service is planning to put Class 6 delivery trucks 
with fuel cells on the road . (Jost 2017) .  According to 
Bloomberg Press, electric cars (EV) may make up more 
than a third of new-car sales by the end of this decade 
(Randall 2017) .  In a recent Forbes Magazine article, 
Newcomb (2017) describes a Mercedes Benz model 
with onboard controls; when one takes her/his hands 
off the steering wheel for five seconds, the car beeps to 
warn the driver and the automobile shuts off after five 
more seconds .  Teal (2017) also describes innovations 
in auto emergency braking systems (AEB) already 
available in many European models along with adaptive 
cruise control, parking assist systems, steering assist, 
and camera-based road sign recognition .
The United States government’s National Highway 
and Transportation Safety Board (NHTSB) has defined 
Autonomous Driving (AD) as having four levels of 
autonomy: 
Level One: You drive the vehicle . Various onboard 
systems back you up .
Level Two: The vehicle can drive some of the time . 
Driver must be ready to take over when necessary .
Level Three: The vehicle can drive autonomously much 
of the time . Driver must be ready to take over with advance 
warning from the vehicle .
Level Four: The vehicle drives itself all the time . 
Passengers can read a newspaper or nap . This level describes 
the ultimate autonomous vehicle (Roy 2016) .
In 2016, Uber, the ride-hailing service, began using 
semi-autonomous vehicles within a grid of downtown 
Pittsburgh, PA . That grid is expected to expand in the 
next couple of years (Cava 2017) . Imagine an Uber 
vehicle, without a driver, coming to your workplace 
or residence to pick you up and delivering you to a 
particular destination . No cash: just Mastercard @, 
Visa @, Paypal @, or ApplePay @ . 
Waymo, previously called Google Cars, is Google’s 
autonomous vehicle project .  By 2016, Waymo already 
had a fleet of semi-autonomous vehicles that have 
driven over 3 million miles with only two accidents, 
neither of which was the fault of the semi-autonomous 
car (Waymo 2016) .  
Other prototypes have also been tested . For example, 
in cooperation with a Chinese company, Volkswagen 
has developed an experimental air car in China .1 This 
car drives itself at level 3 . At this writing, BMW is testing 
a driverless car that parks itself in a parking garage .2 
China has introduced an innovative bus-train hybrid, 
which is electric-powered and has no rails (operates on 
sensors picking up white lines on the road surface) . 
These vehicles will operate in the Chinese city of 
Zhuzhou by 2018 (Thompson 2017) .
Along with the autonomous vehicle revolution comes 
the prospect of underground shuttles to relieve the 
congestion of major cities . Innovator and entrepreneur, 
Elon Musk, aims to wipe out traffic by designing 120 
mile per hour underground shuttles in Los Angeles 
(Sadler 2017) . Uber will also be test flying cars in Dallas 
and Dubai by 2020 (Huet 2017) . The latest news is 
Toyota is planning on using a flying car to light the torch 
for the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo . The initiative, 
code named, SkyDrive, has a long way to go . (AP & 
Kageyama 2017) . Eventually, the trucking industry 
will also get involved . Autonomous trucks and hybrids, 
without drivers, can transport containers of goods 
cross-country on-time and with no overtime . With new 
innovations coming out each month, other forms of 
transportation may surface in the future . Hypo-speed 
planes, trains, and automobiles may also be there, too .
To date, some problems still linger with Mercedes-
Benz (MB) Drive Pilot E-class program cars . According 
to Adams (2016), these cars still have problems with 
merging and arching of the road (taking corners) . 
On the plus-side, the MB S-class vehicles for 2017, 
according to Edelstein (2017), have even more 
autonomous capabilities including vehicle-to-vehicle 
1 See the video at http://www .flixxy .com/volkswagen-
levitating-car .html
2  See the video at http: //www .youtube .com/
watch?feature=playerembedded&v=rgM8MOrss40
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communication, remote parking (similar to the BMW 
parking itself), autonomous braking, following other 
cars in stop-and-go traffic, lane-keep assist, steering 
assist during evasive maneuvers .  Moreover, Edelstein 
(2017) also reports that the MB S5500 plug hybrid for 
2018 will have wireless charging capability . 
            
DRIVERS’ PERCEPTIONS and CONCERNS
The question in most drivers’ minds is: Can we “trust” 
these semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles? Their 
concerns: Semi-autonomous vehicles are controlled 
by sensors, cameras and computers . So, safety and 
performance are only as good as the controlling 
programs involved . 
When I ask participants in my driver safety 
courses about these vehicles, more than two-thirds 
of the participants say they are leery, do not trust 
the technology, or are just plain baffled by the idea 
of a vehicle driving itself .  Since they started driving, 
these seniors have experienced cars with a manual 
transmission (now: dual transmission), no seat belts 
(now: lap and seat belts), no air bags, no cruise control, 
and even no radios . 
To change drivers’ perceptions, Durbin (2017) reports 
that Fiat-Chrysler and Waymo will be offering free rides 
to the public in these semi-autonomous vehicles in the 
Phoenix area . Their objectives are to gain feedback from 
the public and to gain the public’s confidence in these 
vehicles .  All of these vehicles will have backup drivers 
in case of emergencies .
A 2017 J .D . Power Report entitled, US Tech Choice 
Study, revealed that all generational groups, with the 
exception of Gen Y (those born 1977-1994), are become 
skeptical of self-driving technology . Specifically, 40% of 
Boomers (those born 1946-1964) do not see any benefit 
to self-driving vehicles . Only 7 % of Baby Boomers say 
they would purchase a full self-driving vehicle . However, 
younger consumers, such as Gen Z (those born 1995- 
2004), are far more comfortable with autonomous 
technologies than are older generations . Moreover, Gen 
Z consumers also say they have a higher interest in a 
digital key (versus a physical key or a fob) and 50% of 
age cohort indicated that they are definitely/probably 
interested in mobility sharing or co-ownership of a 
future vehicle . Unmanned mobility (level 4) is favored 
by 56% of this age grouping .
Kristin Kolodge, Executive Director of Driver 
Interaction and HMI research, concludes “in most 
cases, as technology concepts get closer to becoming 
reality, consumer curiosity and acceptance increases . 
With autonomous vehicles, we see a pattern which 
trust drives interest in the technology and right now, 
the level of trust is declining .” Kolodge also indicates 
while automated driving is a new and complex concept, 
many consumers must experience it firsthand to fully 
understand it (Dobrian 2017) .
DISCUSSION
When fully-autonomous vehicles come on the road in 
the future, questions may arise about the liability of an 
accident . First, who will be at fault-- the manufacturer 
of the vehicle or the owner of the vehicle?  Second, 
what is known about the condition of the passenger? 
Is she or he legally “under the influence?” Can the 
occupant instruct the vehicle to deliver him/her to a 
particular place? Third, can disabled persons take these 
vehicles without problems? Can children, without adult 
guidance, operate these vehicles? Fourth, will passengers 
even need a driver’s license anymore? Fifth, because 
these vehicles will have multi-lingual capabilities, can 
a foreign traveler with little driving experience operate 
these vehicles? 
On the darker side, just like drones, can these vehicles 
be equipped with weapons by dangerous individuals? 
Also, with more people riding in these vehicles, 
there is a question of whether governmental controls 
(i .e ., controlling the numbers) should be put on the 
vehicles . Another big problem is the issue of hacking 
the computer of these vehicles by unlawful individuals . 
Regarding the potential for hacking, car manufacturers 
and developers need to design a series of firewalls and 
gateways/passwords to prevent unlawful access to the 
vehicle’s computer systems . 
Along with changes in driving environments, traffic 
laws must change . Enforcement also may have to change . 
According to National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL), as of early 2017, 13 states --Alabama, Arkansas, 
California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, New York, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia-- and District of Columbia have passed 
legislation to allow autonomous vehicles to operate on 
those states’ roads (www .ncsl .com) . 
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Possible positive consequences may come about: 
There would be little road rage or any emotional dispute 
over some slight that may happen on the road .  Drowsy 
and drunk people can be easily transported to their 
destination without incident . Persons with handicaps 
will be able to use these vehicles with some modifications 
in seating to travel anywhere . Also, passengers do not 
need to spend long hours navigating traffic on long 
trips . 
CONCLUSION
On a more sociological note, because of the increasing 
cost of such vehicles, more people may opt to car-share, 
or co-own, or to choose other forms of transportation . 
We may have a return to mass transportation--- high 
speed trains or inter-city trolley systems . Or take either 
Lyft or Uber, both ride-hailing entities somewhere . 
Autonomous vehicles may provide a moving office or 
just be people movers . Moreover, with the increasing 
cost of buying and even leasing these new vehicles, 
car-sharing, such as Zipcar, may be more economically 
feasible for the general public .
All these vehicle innovations will require re-learning, 
adjustment, and adaptation . Just as we have learned 
to adjust to other technologies in our daily lives, we 
need to adapt to changes in the area of transportation 
technology .   One final question: How easy is it for “old 
dogs” to learn new tricks?  The author’s answer: That 
depends on certain variables and how they operate . 
Which variables are most influential in getting older 
drivers to accept new technological changes? An 
extensive cross-disciplinary literature exists on what 
is involved in the adoption of innovations and, more 
recently, in resistance to innovations (Ram 1987) .  
Decades ago, Rogers (1962) identified five important 
characteristics of an innovation: Relative Advantage, 
Compatibility, Perceived Risk, Opportunity to Try the 
innovation before committing to it (Trialability), and 
Communicability . Relative advantages of self-driving 
vehicles, for example, are cost and conveniences for 
passengers (no one has to drive) .  Opportunity to try 
the innovation, too, is an on-going process, from semi-
autonomous to fully unmanned, autonomous vehicles .
 
Which variables are important for the implementation 
and acceptance of these vehicles?  Sociologist Stephen 
Vago (1999) organizes potentially influential variables 
into four categories . As Vago (1999) points out, some 
of the variables in these categories tend to stimulate 
change whereas others tend to generate resistance to 
change . The first category focuses on social variables . The 
stimulants for change in this category include the desire 
for prestige, contact with people in other societies who 
are accepting of an innovation, and participating in the 
decision making .  In the second category, psychological 
variables, the motivation to change and perceived 
needs can operate as stimulants to change .  Seniors are, 
generally, more reluctant to try something new . Younger 
people tend to be less reluctant .  That suggest that most 
people would eventually accept the stress-less aspect 
of self-driving vehicles . In the category of economic 
variables, cost and economic advantage are major 
factors affecting change . Is the innovation affordable? 
Will the innovation be a major improvement over 
previously-existing options with which a consumer are 
familiar?  Like variables in the social and psychological 
categories, economic factors can either aid or hinder the 
acceptance of autonomous vehicles . The cost of these 
vehicles relative to the benefits they offer will figure 
into the decision to purchase one in the future . Vago’s 
(1999) fourth category, cultural variables, includes the 
type of culture and the degree of cultural integration . 
For example, a low cultural context and/or low cultural 
integration would be the biggest hindrance to accepting 
autonomous vehicles . Since autonomous vehicles  are 
still completely untested, they are not yet part of the 
fabric of national or global culture(s) .  Therefore, the 
potential impact of cultural variables is presently 
unknown .
Baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964), 
especially, love their cars and trucks as they presently 
are . Using Rogers (1962) innovation adoption lifecycle 
terminology, this age cohort would fall into the 
Laggards category: the 16% of the bell-shaped curve 
who resist the adoption of an innovation .  Interestingly, 
Generation X, generally those born between 1965 and 
1976, would be considered part of the Late Majority, 
the 34% of the curve who adopt just after the “average” 
consumer; Generation Y, generally those born between 
1977 and 1994, and would likely fall into the Early 
Majority, the 34% who adopt the innovation just before 
the average consumer; and Generation Z, generally, 
those born between 1995 and 2012, would fall into the 
small category (2 .5%) of Early Adopters, consumers who 
would adopt an innovation relatively quickly .  A lot of 
research conducted in the 1960’s and 1970s attempted 
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to identify the characteristics of the individuals that 
fell into these categories . The evidence reporting the 
characteristics of the individuals falling into each 
category was inconsistent (Harper and Leicht 2011:244-
245) .  
In sum, to maintain their mobility, older drivers 
must adapt to changing transportation conditions 
and do so soon . Automobiles, trucks and other hybrid 
vehicles, will become more complex, more efficient, and 
more innovative than any vehicle previously built . The 
rate of innovation in these vehicles has also increased 
dramatically . All car manufacturers have a target date 
range of between 2020 to 2030 for autonomous vehicles 
to be available for purchase (Kagayama 2017; Randall 
2017) . Whether that target date range is achievable 
remains to be seen . However, European automakers, 
including  Mercedes, Volkswagen, and Volvo, are already 
at the forefront of the race to produce the first truly-
autonomous vehicle .  Therefore, this author speculates 
that the Europeans will likely win this race . However, 
the Chinese may surprise everyone by being the first 
nation to produce a fully-autonomous vehicle .
The actions of powerful individuals and communication 
sources also matter .  For safety reasons, governments may 
either phase out or pull older vehicles off the highways to 
accommodate newer vehicles .  One important concern 
is that newer, autonomous vehicles cannot communicate 
with older, semi-autonomous vehicles .  Various popular 
media, especially social media and movies, will also 
influence people’s views on autonomous vehicles . It 
is likely that more consumers will look at these new 
vehicles as convenient modes of transportation and not 
as troublesome, expensive vehicles which will replace 
their “beloved” vintage “toys .” Will the new vehicles 
have the soul and personality attributed to much-loved, 
older vehicles? 
 
From Model A to flying cars, driver-less trucks, and 
bus-train hybrids, our lives will be forever changed 
by these new vehicles . People will travel more; people 
will spend their time during travel quite differently-- 
e .g ., some will read a book, some will sleep, some will 
socialize with the other passengers, and others will 
work . With a huge drop in fatalities on roads, our lives 
will be far safer than in the past . Eventually, people’s 
perspectives on autonomous vehicles will change and 
will accept them . Younger generations are already 
comfortable with these vehicles and, as these generations 
age, autonomous vehicles will be a way of life . Until 
manufacturers eliminate the glitches and problems in 
these vehicles (as of June 2017), we will have to wait 
until these manufacturers make the decision to release 
them for public and private use . In that world of the near 
future, once autonomous vehicles are standard on the 
road, Driver Safety courses will no longer be necessary .
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The Drug Overdose Epidemic: 
Deaths of Despair or Deaths of Addiction?
By 
Marissa Botelho, Jennifer Lemos, Jessica Souza and Roger Clark
Rhode Island College
INTRODUCTION
The drug overdose epidemic in the United States has 
been, and continues to be, a scourge upon the land .  In 
2016, for which data were beginning to come in at this 
writing, approximately 62,000 Americans died from 
overdoses, about a 19 percent increase over 2015 (Katz 
2017) . This number outstrips that of American lives 
lost to automobile accidents, gun shots and suicides 
(Economist 2017a) . The drug overdose epidemic has 
become increasingly visible .  One Ohio coroner’s office 
in 2016, for example, stored dead opioid victims in 
refrigerated trucks outside its office because the bodies 
were pouring in faster than they could be processed 
(Economist 2017b) .  Quinones (2017) reports that “drug 
overdosing” is currently the number one killer of people 
under 50 in the United States .
Drug overdose deaths, along with alcohol-related 
deaths and suicides, are increasingly known as “deaths 
of despair,” and are attributed to a reversal in what 
some imagined to be irreversible; that is, the mortality 
and morbidity rates for middle-aged white men and 
women (Case and Deaton 2015) . In recent years 
the life expectancy for this social category has been 
decreasing, not increasing, as it continues to be for 
all others in the U . S . and the Western world . Monnat 
(2016) found a strong correlation between counties that 
voted for Donald Trump and ones that had high drug, 
alcohol and suicide mortality rates and concluded that 
this signaled that Trump voters often suffered from 
hopelessness and despair .  Further contributing to the 
notion that drug overdose deaths are rooted in despair 
is convincing research suggesting that such deaths may 
often be misclassified suicides (e .g ., Rockett et al . 2014) . 
Suicides, most assume, are a sign of hopelessness and, if 
overdose deaths are really hidden suicides, the thinking 
goes, such deaths are also a sign of hopelessness .
Our investigation, largely driven by our belief that 
drug overdose deaths can be reasonably investigated as a 
manifestation of a particular kind of cultural lag, began 
with the expectation that we would uncover evidence 
that drug overdose deaths are in fact deaths of despair . 
We found such evidence, but also found evidence, 
perhaps even stronger, for another perspective: that 
Abstract
Using a framework offered by the concept of cultural lag, the authors examine two perspectives on the drug 
overdose epidemic afflicting America .  A “deaths of despair” perspective emphasizes cumulative disadvantages that 
have beset certain segments of the U .S . population, rendering them “desperate for relief .”  In contrast, a “heroin 
markets” perspective suggests that white-powder heroin from Colombia has made heroin an attractive substitute 
for prescription drugs, like Oxycontin, and that the recent phenomenal growth in the number of overdose deaths 
has more to do with its market than anything else . The authors use secondary data to test three hypotheses 
derived from these perspectives . Although the available data are limited, they find support for both perspectives, 
particularly the “heroin market,” one .  They discuss implications .
Keywords: cultural lag, deaths of despair, heroin markets, deaths of addiction
The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Deaths of Despair or Deaths of Addiction?
18
these deaths have become more about markets for 
heroin and, perhaps, fentanyl-- a narcotic, analgesic, 
and sedative . We will first consider the case that the 
overdose epidemic is an instance of cultural lag .
The Overdose Epidemic as an Instance of Cultural 
Lag
William Ogburn’s (1922) concept of cultural lag 
refers to the social problems that can occur as the 
nonmaterial culture of a society (e.g., beliefs, values, 
perspectives) adapts to economic or technological 
changes.  The implicit period of delayed adjustment can 
generate serious hardships for a population.
  
In the case of the drug overdose epidemic, there 
have been at least two changes in the material culture 
(e.g., everything tangible that society produces, such as 
tools, inventions, artifacts ) that have been viewed as 
appropriate suspects.  One change, the massive upheaval 
in U.S. manufacturing and job loss, brought about by 
automation and relocation over the past five decades, 
has been associated with the demand for opiates. Parts 
of the U.S. have suffered selective economic declines 
that have led to downward mobility for many people. 
This increased economic vulnerability, augmented 
by the Great Recession of the last decade, has raised 
fears and anxieties that have, in turn, led many to drown 
and/or drug their sorrows, and sometimes to take their 
lives. Monnat (2016) demonstrates that the most 
economically distressed counties in the U.S. are also 
the ones that have the highest rates of drug, alcohol and 
suicide mortality.
In the middle 1990s, a second kind of material 
change took place: the development of prescription 
drugs that promised the delivery of “safe,” presumably 
non-addictive, opioid products for pain relief. This 
change increased dramatically the supply of opioids in 
the American marketplace. Until then, doctors largely 
prescribed opioids only for patients suffering from 
acute pain or terminal conditions. 
 
Perhaps the major “breakthrough” was Purdue 
Pharma’s discovery and marketing, in 1996, of 
Oxycontin. Oxycontin, a time-released formula 
for large, and varying, dosages of oxycodone, was 
designed for people suffering from chronic pain. This 
drug gained FDA approval for this purpose and was 
energetically marketed by Purdue, which employed 
a sales force that used practices that, some (e.g., Van 
Zee 2009; Quinones 2015) say, were often unethical 
and sometimes illegal. To suggest, as we do, that the 
development of a product (in this case Oxycontin) was 
responsible for the increased supply of legal opioids 
is not to ignore the importance of changing attitudes 
towards opioids in the medical community, attitudes that 
as early as the 1980s had begun to doubt the thinking 
that opioids were highly addictive and generally to be 
avoided (e.g., Quinones 2015: 15ff). The widespread 
sale and use of drugs like Oxycontin would have been 
impossible if a context of relatively relaxed attitudes 
towards the addictive potential of opioids had not 
emerged in the medical community.
Two Perspectives on the Drug Death Epidemic
We have found two major perspectives accounting 
for the drug death epidemic: a “deaths of despair” 
perspective and a “heroin market” perspective. Both 
perspectives are of recent origin.  The first perspective, 
associated with Anne Case and Angus Deaton1 (e.g., 
Case and Deaton 2017; Case and Deaton 2015a; Case 
and Deaton 2015b) argues that a loss of a sense of 
wellbeing within a significant swath of the American 
population is primarily responsible for its having 
turned to highly addictive drugs, alcohol and suicide. In 
its most recent and comprehensive formulation (Case 
and Deaton 2017), the “deaths of despair” lens suggests 
that a cumulative disadvantage has occurred, most 
remarkably for whites with lower education. Unlike 
hypotheses that have located the mortality problem in 
stagnant and declining incomes (e.g., Stiglitz 2015), 
hypotheses that Case and Deaton claim cannot account 
for why less-educated whites should have poorer 
mortality outcomes than, for example, less-educated 
members of minority groups, the “deaths of despair” 
perspective traces health and mortality declines to the 
progressively worsening labor market opportunities 
of less-educated whites and various correlates of this 
worsening.
The steady decline in job opportunities for whites 
with lower education levels has not only had enormous 
effects on their marriage and divorce prospects (Cherlin 
2009; Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone 2016), but also 
on the life chances of their children (Murray 2012; 
Putnam 2015).  Members of this social category have 
1Case and Deaton are affiliated with Princeton University’s Center 
for Health and Wellbeing.
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become much less likely to marry, much more likely to 
divorce when they do marry, much more likely to have 
children out of wedlock, much more likely to expose 
their children to unstable family lives, and much less 
likely to enable those children to attain good educations 
than did less educated whites in the past. Moreover, 
Case and Deaton (2017:33) point out that “half of the 
men who are out of the labor force are taking pain 
medication, and two thirds of those take prescription 
painkiller, such as opioids.” Case and Deaton concluded 
that reversing the trend towards deaths of despair 
cannot be done with purely economic solutions, at least 
not through short-term economic solutions. What is 
necessary is a program that addresses the family issues, 
the lack of spiritual fulfillment, “perceived meaning 
and satisfaction” (Case and Deaton 2017: 34) that lead 
to despair.  As Case and Deaton note, this prescription 
is not a particularly encouraging one. 
 
In this paper we focus exclusively on drug overdose 
deaths rather than combining them with alcohol-related 
deaths and suicides. We also use state-level data. One 
of the hypotheses we examine emerges directly from 
this “deaths of despair” perspective, namely:
Hypothesis 1: States with populations reporting high 
levels of overall wellbeing will have lower drug overdose 
death rates than states with populations reporting low levels 
of overall wellbeing.
We examined variables that, while not being proofs 
against despair, had been suggested to be inhibitors 
of despair. Religiosity is one factor that kept coming 
up in our examination of the literature on suicide and 
alcoholism, drug use, and even despair itself. Thus, 
for example, in a large number of articles published 
between 1980 and 2008, Gearing and Lizardi (2009) 
found epidemiological support for the protective effects 
of religious commitment, a protection that existed across 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Hindu communities. 
Similarly, in another review article, Haber et al. (2011) 
found a consistent inverse relationship between 
alcoholism and religion or spirituality. Kendler  Gardner, 
and Prescott (1997) and Binswanger et al. (2012) 
have found evidence, in disparate populations, that 
religiosity can be a protective factor against drug use 
and overdosing. Other studies (e.g., McClain et al. 
2003) have even found evidence that spiritual wellbeing 
can be a protection against despair in terminally ill 
cancer patients. The literature is not unequivocal, to be 
sure. In Dreamland, Quinones’ (2015) marvelous study 
of the opiate epidemic, he found that addiction spread 
particularly quickly within one church community. 
In general, though, the literature led us to our 
second hypothesis we propose related to the “death of 
despair .” 
Hypothesis 2:  States with high percentages of their 
populations saying they are not religious will have 
higher drug overdose death rates than other states. 
If  the “death of despair” perspective on drug 
overdose deaths has a short pedigree, the “heroin 
market” perspective, as far as we can tell, has an 
even shorter one. We first saw it articulated in a short 
Economist article on May 11th, 2017 (Economist 2017c). 
This perspective argues that the long-term trend in drug 
deaths may not only have much to do with working-
class despair, but also that its recent, life-defying rise 
has even more to do with access to heroin markets.  
Until about 2010, the increase in opioid deaths was 
highly related to prescription drugs, like Oxycontin.  In 
the past few years, heroin and potent synthetic drugs, 
like fentanyl, have become more significant, even 
though most users of the latter two drugs were formerly 
abusers of the former. 
 
Drug abusers often make the switch from prescription 
drugs to heroin and synthetic drugs because the latter are 
cheaper and more potent .  There are actually two major 
kinds of heroin on the U . S . market currently and only 
one of these, a white-powder heroin from Colombia, 
looks and acts sufficiently like crushed pain pills that 
it has made the switch an easy one for prescription-
drug addicts . Once this switch is made, fentanyl, or 
some other synthetic drug, often comes into the mix . 
According to the Economist (2017c), a Mexican brown-
powder or black-tar heroin, which figures much more 
prominently in Quinones’s (2015) story and is more 
characteristically found west of the Mississippi, has 
“probably deterred many painkiller addicts from trying 
the drug (i .e ., heroin), and has kept synthetic opioids at 
bay” according to the Economist (2017c) .  
While neither the Economist nor its primary data 
source, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), provide 
us with a way of determining precisely which states are 
most involved in the white-powder heroin market, the 
CDC has recently begun to provide data on how many 
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of the drug overdose deaths in a state can be attributed 
to heroin . These data are only available, however, for the 
28 states for which the CDC finds the heroin overdose 
death data “good” quality or better .  
 As a first approximation of the market for 
white-powder heroin in a state, we use statewide 
heroin overdose death rates to test the heroin market 
perspective:
Hypothesis 3: States with higher heroin overdose death 
rates will have higher overall drug overdose rates than states 
with lower heroin overdose death rates.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH and MAJOR 
VARIABLES
Data Sources and Limitations
The tests of our hypotheses are based on data available 
to researchers for secondary analysis. Specifically, we 
used data from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2017a) 
and from Gallup’s (2017) “State of the States.” Data for 
this project were not always easy to locate. We were 
limited by budget to materials available online, but we 
have located data sources that researchers with deeper 
pockets or more prestigious institutional affiliations 
may also want to explore. 
 
Because of budget and data limitations, we had to 
make some methodological compromises. For example, 
when we tried to measure heroin markets, we ran into 
our most severe data barriers. Not surprisingly, there are 
no good state-level data on the kinds of heroin available 
in illegal heroin markets. Therefore, we decided that a 
decent, but imperfect, substitute measure is the heroin 
overdose death rate by state.2   But certain bits of critical 
information are, to the best of our knowledge, simply 
untapped as of now. 
2We used this measure, aware of the limitation that it is a 
constituent of our dependent variable, the overall overdose death 
rate by state, and therefore likely to be more highly correlated with 
it than other possible measures, the likeliest, perhaps, being the 
drug arrest rate by state. Unfortunately, alternate measures like 
crime rates, including the drug arrest rate, vary with many things 
other than heroin usage (including the usage of other drugs and the 
highly variable inclinations of state law enforcement authorities 
to criminalize drug usage). Therefore, we view crime rates as an 
even more imperfect measure of heroin markets than the heroin 
overdose death rate. Moreover, we have determined that not all 
constituents of the overall drug overdose death rate are strongly 
correlated. Thus, for instance, the methadone overdose death rate 
Major Variables and Statistical Analysis
Our dependent variable is the overall drug overdose 
death rate per 100,000 (age-adjusted) in 2013 and 2015 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017a). The three major 
independent variables in our analysis are measures of 
a state’s population’s overall wellbeing, its religiosity 
and its heroin markets. For the first two independent 
variables we use data provided by Gallup’s (2017) 
“State of the States” for 2016. These data summarize 
daily polls taken throughout the year to provide overall 
measures on many state (and city and individual) 
characteristics. Our measure of states’ overall wellbeing 
is Gallup’s Overall Well-Being Index in 2016, a measure 
that is a composite indicator of people’s sense of 
purpose, their social and financial wellbeing, their 
sense of community and physical health.3  
Our measure of religiosity is the percentage of a 
state’s residents who say religion is not important in 
their lives and that they seldom or never attend religious 
services. A high score on this measure is interpreted, 
for this study, as a low score on religiosity. We used 
Gallup (2017) for our 2016 measure and found an 
earlier Gallup measure of the same variable in 2011 
from Hicken (2012).
With no more than 50, and sometimes as few as 
28, states as units of analysis, there are relatively few 
degrees of freedom to conduct simple linear multiple 
regression analyses, especially given the relatively 
large number of independent variables we are initially 
interested in. Therefore, we employ forward stepwise 
regression analyses via the Statistical Package of 
the Social Sciences (SPSS). We use the variables we 
speculated might be related to the drug overdose death 
rate and select variables that create an economical 
model.  Specifically, we instructed SPSS to add the most 
significant variable at each step of its processing until 
is correlated with the heroin overdose death rate at a weak .11 
level.  In the absence of a better measure of the extent to which 
heroin markets thrive in states, then, and with genuine concern 
about the appropriateness of our measure, we proceeded.
3We spoke with a Gallup representative about obtaining measures 
of overall wellbeing for earlier years, but found the costs to do so 
were beyond our (and our College’s) means. The closest we were 
able to come to an earlier measure was not the actual index in an 
earlier year but a ranking of states by overall wellbeing in 2012 
(Gallup-Heathways 2012). We have used these data in our panel 
regression analysis reported later in this paper.  
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all variables not in the selected model have p values 
that are greater than .05.  
The forward stepwise regression analysis enables a 
cross-sectional examination of the variables that have 
the greatest controlled association with our dependent 
variable, drug overdose death rates. But both the 
“despair” and the “markets” perspective focus on change 
in drug overdose death rates. Consequently, another 
statistical tool we use here is panel regression analysis. 
Panel regression analysis permits the evaluation of the 
impact of several independent variables on change in 
a dependent variable by regressing the latter on itself 
(in 2015) and the independent variables at an earlier 
time (in 2013). This statistical tool usually yields a 
conservative test because the lagged dependent variable 
is normally extremely highly correlated with itself at 
the earlier time (cf. Hannan 1979). This is especially 
likely to be the case with short time lags, such as the 
one used in this analysis (two years).
Based on the Economist’s (2107c) analysis, we 
assumed that states with higher heroin death rates 
are ones in which a white-powder heroin market is 
dominant, since it is in these states that prescription 
drug addicts will have most likely switched over to 
heroin. Since the CDC (2017) has determined that 
heroin deaths are sufficiently accurate in 28 states, 
those are the states for which published data on heroin 
death rates were available in 2014 and 2015. We use 
these data in both a cross-sectional stepwise regression 
analysis and our panel regression analysis.
We entered nine other variables into our cross-
sectional analyses, anticipating that some of these 
might supersede our main independent variables 
as predictors of drug overdose deaths rates. The 
conventional view that economic deprivation leads 
to drug misuse (e.g., Stiglitz 2015) led us to several 
possibilities. We expected, for example that states 
with higher unemployment rates would have higher 
drug overdose death rates than others and so entered 
a measure of unemployment rates in 2015 (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2017). We expected that states with 
higher poverty rates would experience higher overdose 
death rates than others and so entered poverty rates for 
2015 (Bishaw and Glassman 2016). We thought that 
better educated populations would have lower overdose 
death rates than others and entered the percentage of 
the state population with a high school diploma or 
higher (Wikipedia 2017, based on U.S. Census data). 
We also expected states with older populations, which 
are more likely to receive legal opioid prescriptions 
for pain, to have higher drug overdose death rates than 
others and entered a measure of median age in 2014 
(Murphy 2015). Along these same lines, we felt the 
drug overdose death rates might directly vary with the 
prescription rates of legal opioid painkillers and so 
entered a measure of this in 2012, the date for which 
we could find such an indicator (Paulozzi et al. 2014). 
The literature led us to expect that drug overdose deaths 
might be concentrated in states with predominantly 
white populations and, in any case, wanted to enter a 
variable measuring race, so use data on the percentage 
of a state’s population that was white in 2015 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2017b). We thought it possible 
that two kinds of populations might be more likely to 
have strong norms against drug use: people identifying 
as Republicans and those who are very religious, and 
so we entered measures of each, again using Gallup 
data (Gallup 2017). We also speculated that marijuana 
might be a gateway drug to drug overdose deaths and 
so entered a measure of statewide marijuana use, based 
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health in 2014 
(Hughes et al. 2016).
Results
We first performed a cross-sectional analysis 
involving the drug overdose death rate as the dependent 
variable and 11 independent or predictor variables .4 
These 11 predictors were: the unemployment rate in 
2015, the percentage of the population claiming to be 
nonreligious in 2016, the proportion of the population 
with a high school certificate or more of formal 
education, the prescription rate of legal opioids in 
2012, the percentage of the population that was white 
in 2015, the poverty rate in 2015, the median age of the 
population in 2015, the percentage of the population 
with a Republican party affiliation in 2016, the 
percentage of the population claiming to be religious in 
2016, the Gallup index measuring the level of well being 
experienced by the population in 2016, and marijuana 
use in 2014 .
Table 1 shows that the forward stepwise regression 
found that two of these variables constituted an 
4We did not include heroin overdose death rates, which are only 
available for 28 states and which the CDC suggests may not be 
reliable enough for cross-state comparisons.
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economical model: the index of overall wellbeing in 
2016, with a beta of - .75 in the final model, and the 
percent of the population claiming to be nonreligious in 
2016, with a beta of  .51 in the final model .  This finding 
would appear to support the perspective that drug 
overdose deaths are substantially a result of despair . 
States with higher well-being indices have lower 
drug overdose death rates than others and states with 
higher percentages of their populations claiming to 
be nonreligious (or lacking a major protection against 
despair) have higher death rates than others . (See Table 
1 .)
   
Table 1.  Final Model Produced by Forward 
Stepwise Regression of the Drug Overdose Death 
Rate by State on Eleven Independent Variables 
without a Measure of Heroin-Related Death Rates
          Betas
Overall Well-Being Index, 2016             - .75***
Percentage of Population Claiming to
Be Nonreligious, 2016     .51***
N        50
Adjusted R-square     .42
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the  .001 level .
However, the problem with this analysis, as 
proponents of the “market” perspective on drug 
overdose deaths suggest, is that it does not take into 
account the effect of the market for heroin in states . 
We have tried to take an accounting of its effect by 
measuring the market in terms of the heroin death rate 
in states, despite the reservations we have for using this 
measure . Among these reservations are that “good” 
to “excellent” data about heroin deaths rates are only 
available for 28 states and, even for these, the Centers 
for Disease Control advise that they not be used for 
comparisons among states (CDC, 2017) . But, we 
reasoned, if the heroin death rates are so incomparable, 
they would provide a relatively conservative test of 
the “market” perspective, even if heroin death rates 
are not the ideal measure of the degree to which states 
are involved in heroin markets . Their incomparability 
might lead us to expect a lower correlation with overall 
drug overdose death rates than we would obtain with 
more comparable data . (See Table 2 .)
Table 2.  Final Model Produced by Forward 
Stepwise Regression of Drug Overdose Death 
Rate by State on Thirteen Independent Variables, 
including Heroin-Induced Death Rates
         Betas
Heroin-Induced Death Rates   .67***
Opioid Prescription Rates, 2012              .33**
N                28
Adjusted R-square             .52
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the  .001 level .
Still, Table 2 must be interpreted with caution .  The 
data in Table 2 suggest that, when a measure of heroin 
deaths is introduced, only it (beta = .67) and the legal 
opioid prescription rate (beta =  .33) appear in a model . 
Moreover, this model explains about 10 percent more 
variation (adjusted R-square =  .52) in drug overdose 
death rates for the 28 states involved than did the model 
in Table 1 (adjusted R-square = . 42) for 50 states .  We 
thus, cautiously, infer that, in cross-sectional models at 
least, there appears to be greater support for the “market” 
than the “despair” perspective on drug overdose deaths .
 
Unfortunately, cross-sectional analyses such the 
ones presented in Tables 1 and 2 cannot sort out time-
sequencing and one is left with the questions: which 
comes first, the despair, the market for heroin, or the 
drug deaths?  Also, would the relatively strong support 
for the heroin “market” perspective persist if we focused 
on changes in the drug overdose death rate rather than 
simply levels of that rate?  Both questions led us to 
employ panel regression, a technique that requires early 
and late measures of the dependent variable as well as 
measures of the independent variables of interest at 
approximately the same time as the early measure of the 
dependent variable . 
 The “lag” in our panel regression analyses is limited 
by the data we’ve been able to find online .  But, in general, 
those analyses again tend to support the “market” 
perspective .  Thus, when we examined what may have 
affected the change in the drug overdose death rate in the 
period between 2013 and 2015 (the period for which we 
can find online reasonably-appropriate measures of our 
key independent variables), we find stronger controlled 
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relations between early measures of the heroin death 
rate and change in drug overdose death rates than we 
do early measures of either of our of statewide despair 
measures . Table 3 boils down these findings and shows, 
as one would expect, that the strongest predictor in 
our model of 2015 drug overdose deaths rate in the 28 
states involved was drug overdose death rates in 2013 
(beta =  .50) .  A close second was heroin overdose death 
rates in 2014 (beta =  .49), followed by the legal opioid 
prescription rates in 2012 (beta =  .36) .  Neither of our 
measures of despair or a potential for despair—e .g ., 
the ranking of states by levels of overall well being in 
2012 (beta = - .18) and the percentage of the population 
claiming to be nonreligious in 2011 (beta =  .13), was 
statistically significantly related to drug overdose deaths 
in 2015 when the other variables were controlled, even 
though both variables were related in the predicted 
direction to the dependent variable . (See Table 3 .)
Table 3.  Panel Regression Analysis of Drug 
Overdose Death Rate in 2015 on Itself in 2013 and 
the Heroin Overdose Death Rate in 2014, Opioid 
Prescription Rate in 2012, the Ranking of States 
by Levels of Overall Well Being in 2012, and the 
Percentage of Those Claiming to be Nonreligious 
2011
         Betas
Drug Overdose Death Rate 2013   .50***
Heroin Overdose Death Rate 2014   .49***
Legal Opioid Prescription Rate 2012      .36*
Ranking by Overall Well Being 2012         - .18
Percent Nonreligious 2011    .13
N       28
Adjusted R-square     .81
Notes: * indicates significance at the  .05 level; ***, at the  .001 
level .
DISCUSSION
We find support for both the “deaths of despair” 
and the “heroin market” perspectives, although the 
support for the latter appears to be stronger than that 
for the former .  In a cross-sectional analysis involving 
all 50 states, without a measure of heroin markets only 
available for 28 states, stepwise regression picked our two 
“despair” indicators, overall wellbeing and the absence 
of religiosity, out of a lineup involving 11 variables . 
But when we introduced heroin death rates into an 
analysis involving only 28 states, it and our indicator of 
the legal opioid prescription rate (in 2012) pushed the 
despair indicators out of the picture .  Moreover, in our 
panel analysis involving the four dependent variables of 
interest—the two despair variables, the heroin market 
variable and the opioid prescription rate variables—
only the latter two had significant associations with 
drug overdose death rates in 2015, when drug overdose 
deaths rates in 2013 were controlled . Neither of our 
perspectives, by the way, had predicted that the legal 
opioid prescription rate would still have the significant 
impact it appears to have on drug overdose deaths 
in America . That it does is certainly worthy of policy 
consideration (see below) .
We have hinted at the caution with which we report 
these results . Much of the caution has to do with data 
limitations, although some of it has to do with more 
theoretical concerns . We are pleased enough with our 
despair measures for the cross-sectional analyses, but 
neither is easily or cheaply available for the proper 
year (2013) of the panel analysis, and the wellbeing 
indicator, a ranking of indexes rather than the indexes 
themselves for that analysis, is suboptimal . Our measure 
of heroin markets is less than ideal for several reasons . 
Theoretically, we would much prefer some measure of 
the degree to which white-powder heroin dominates a 
state market for heroin . One can imagine polling being 
able to tap such a concept, in much the same way The 
Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality 
now polls for marijuana usage . But we’re not there yet . 
Our indicator, the heroin overdose death rate, entails 
many difficulties, not the least of which is its likely 
unreliability for years to come .  But even if it were 
perfectly reliable, it is obviously a sub-dimension of the 
overall drug overdose death rate and therefore more 
likely to be correlated with that rate than a measure with 
more obvious face validity .  Perhaps the most obvious 
problem, however, is the fact that the heroin death 
rate is available for only 28, just over half of the states . 
One has to wonder what kinds of biases are involved in 
such a partial representation, but they surely include, 
to some degree, a variable concern for the growing 
heroin epidemic within the larger drug epidemic . At 
a more theoretical level, our results may be criticized 
for entanglement with the ecological fallacy .  Thus, for 
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instance, just because states with high overall wellbeing 
indexes have relatively low drug overdose death rates 
does not mean that individuals with a sense of wellbeing 
are protected from overdosing .
Still, our results are suggestive, both theoretically 
and in terms of public policy .  At the theoretical level, 
they suggest that the transition from addiction to legal 
prescription painkillers to addiction to heroin and 
synthetic drugs like fentanyl may now be the main 
driver of rapidly increasing drug overdose deaths in 
the United States .  As a consequence, those concerned 
about the drug overdose epidemic may need to 
distinguish it, conceptually, from the somewhat clearer 
instance of deaths of despair, such as suicide .  It may be 
more useful to think of drug overdose deaths as deaths 
of addiction, addictions that may originally have had 
some foundation in despair, but that may also have 
had some foundation in chronic pain management or 
simple experimentation with opioids for pleasure .
Case and Deaton (2017) point out that dealing with 
overdose deaths as deaths of despair actually points to 
policies that are anything but simple to enact .  It would 
not only mean attempting to deal creatively with the 
economic changes that have led to widespread economic 
discomfort, but also with intervening conditions 
like later and more fragile marriages and an inability 
to provide supportive families for children . If one 
conceptualized the drug overdose epidemic in terms 
of deaths of addiction, however, the question becomes 
one of how to prevent addiction in the first place and 
how to make it more easily treated if it occurs .  States 
have begun to deal with both of these issues .  Thus, for 
instance, Florida (Johnson et al . 2014) and Kentucky 
(Chapman 2017) are among states that have begun to 
regulate pain clinics and doctors who have prescribed 
opioids . Various states and municipalities have begun 
to sue pharmaceutical companies to get them to change 
their advertising methods (e .g ., Economist 2017b) . 
Various jurisdictions have expanded access to Naloxone, 
a drug that treats overdoses, as well as to treatment and 
rehabilitation centers (e .g ., Chapman 2017) and some 
public efforts have been made to reduce the stigma 
associated with addiction so that concerned friends and 
relatives are more inclined to help (Quinones 2015) . 
 On a less positive note, Medicaid expansion under 
the Affordable Care Act has accounted for roughly half 
of Medicaid expenditures on substance abuse treatment 
in many of the states with the greatest drug overdose 
death rates (Alonso-Zaldivar 2017) . At this writing, 
these funds, utilized by low-income adults, are likely to 
be cut substantially under Republican healthcare plans .
What to do about the markets for white-powder 
heroin and synthetic opioids is harder to prescribe, 
but so far nothing seems to have worked .  Noting the 
markets for white-powder and black-tar heroin are 
largely separated by the Mississippi River, the Economist 
(2017c) recommends that “This is a rare case where one 
should pray that America stays divided .”  But prayer has 
its limits .  And efforts have been made to shut down 
dark net sources of synthetic drugs, even as these 
sources continue to pop up, like targets in a deadly 
game of whack-a-mole (Popper 2017) .
   
Dealing effectively with the overdose drug epidemic 
will undoubtedly require efforts on many fronts .  But 
choosing the right fronts will increasingly depend on 
figuring out what they are .   Generating relevant data and 
making those data more readily available to researchers, 
however, are certainly going to be two of them .
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Culture, Change, and Cultural Lag: A Commentary and a Challenge 
     
By
         
Josephine A. Ruggiero
William F . Ogburn (1886-1959) introduced the 
concept of cultural lag in his book, Social Change with 
Respect to Culture and Original Nature, published in 
1922 . A staunch advocate of using objective data as the 
basis for research conclusions, Ogburn played many 
important roles during his life .
Howard Odum (1951: 147-152), a contemporary of 
Obgurn’s, composed a detailed biography of Ogburn’s 
work and accomplishments . Ogburn earned his M . 
A . and Ph .D . degrees in sociology from Columbia 
University (in 1909 and 1912 respectively) . After college, 
he taught high-school age students and later, students 
at the college level . During his career, Ogburn was also 
an extraordinarily prolific author of books, articles, 
reviews, brochures, pamphlets, and book chapters in 
sociology as well as across disciplinary boundaries .
Among his non-academic roles, Ogburn served as a 
president of the American Statistical Association and 
as editor of its journal . He was the first sociologist to 
be president of the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC) and to chair the SSRC’s Problems and Policy 
Committee .  In 1918-19, during World War I, Ogburn 
served as examiner and head of the Cost of Living 
Department for the National War Labor Board and as 
a special agent for the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics . He was an extraordinarily prolific author 
of books, articles, reviews, brochures, pamphlets, and 
book chapters in sociology as well as across disciplinary 
boundaries . An important indicator of Ogburn’s 
recognition and esteem among American sociologists 
was his being chosen, in 1929, as the 19th President of 
the American Sociological Society  (now known as The 
American Sociological Association) .  
About Culture, Change, and Cultural Lag
As Ogburn recognized, culture is a central concept 
not only to the field of anthropology but also in 
sociology . Within the first several weeks of the course, 
students in Introductory Sociology learn about the 
meaning and complexities of culture . For example, they 
learn that culture, described in simple terms as the way 
of life of a society, consists of both material (visible) 
and non-material (invisible) aspects . They learn that the 
visible items that people produce such as books, tools, 
inventions, art forms, movies, television programs, and 
video games are influenced by and, in turn, influence 
invisible aspects like ideas, theories, values, beliefs, and 
knowledge .
Therefore, culture may be aptly compared to an 
iceberg or a large tree with deep roots . Both images 
convey that some aspects/components of culture such 
as behavior are visible and other aspects including 
beliefs, values, and assumptions are invisible or hidden . 
An iceberg is a lot larger that the part we see above the 
surface . Similarly, when we look at a tree, we focus on 
its branches and leaves, or lack thereof, not on its roots . 
Typically, a tree’s deepest roots tend to be hidden from 
view . 
A deeper examination of the concept of culture 
reveals that it has a number of other characteristics: 
Culture is shared and passed on through the process of 
socialization .  In a complex, heterogeneous society like 
the U . S ., the dominant culture is shared and passed on 
by at least the majority of a society’s members through 
instruction and imitation . In heterogeneous societies 
sub-cultures and counter-cultures that shape the 
behavior, attitudes, values, and beliefs of some smaller 
segments of the population are also typically present .
The elements that comprise a culture are 
interdependent, patterned, and structured-- that is, 
they fit together in a meaningful way . Therefore, when 
one area of a culture changes, change usually occurs 
in another/others, although not necessarily at the 
same time . This time gap captures the idea of cultural 
lag; that is, in the process of change, material aspects 
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often change first and in an out-of-sync way with non-
material aspects .  Semi- and fully-autonomous vehicles 
offer a good example . Some of these vehicles are 
already, or will be, available starting in 2019 . However, 
the attitudes--especially of older drivers/passengers as 
compared to younger ones, may not be in sync with 
this technological change when these vehicles become 
available in large numbers . Equally important is that 
current federal and state motor vehicle laws will become 
obsolete in regulating these vehicles . Thus, creating new 
laws will be necessary .  
Culture provides a design for living which includes 
human solutions to the basic physical problems and 
abstract concerns that human beings across the globe 
encounter . Humans provide for the continuity of 
their society by developing the same range of social 
institutions (e .g .,  some form(s) of family, an educational 
system, a political system, an economy, religion(s), and 
a health care delivery system . The forms which these 
social institutions take, however, may vary considerably 
from one society to another as well as over time . 
As stated earlier, an important characteristic of 
culture is that it changes. Specialists in the field of social 
change  have developed a framework for analyzing 
the complexities of change . After identifying the 
phenomenon of interest (the what), they examine four 
other aspects of change: 1) level (where in the social 
system the change is taking place-- macro vs . micro 
level); 2) duration (length of time a particular change 
lasts after it has been accepted (e .g ., short- vs . long-
term);  3) magnitude (how small or large the change 
is-- incremental/a modest alteration vs . comprehensive/
sweeping/structural alterations);  and  4) rate (speed 
and pattern of the change) .  The nature and scope of the 
alteration/change depends on the type society in which 
the culture exists (e .g ., more complex, heterogeneous 
vs . simpler, more  homogeneous society) . 
Although cultural change is not the same as social 
change, the two bear a reciprocal-- that is, a mutual 
cause and effect, relationship to each other . Cultural 
changes can lead to social changes and vice versa . 
For example, the invention and availability of the 
automobile, a cultural product, affected social changes 
including residential patterns in cities, the settlement of 
the suburbs, recreational patterns of families, and the 
dating practices of young people .
Ogburn's keen observations of American society 
of his time led him to introduce the classic concept of 
cultural lag into the vocabulary of sociology and into 
the study of social and cultural change . He proposed 
that most social changes in a modern society arise 
from alterations in material culture .  He used the term 
cultural lag to point out that the non-material aspects 
of culture like values, attitudes, beliefs, theories, and 
philosophies (the things we cannot see) tend to resist 
change and/or to change at a much slower pace than 
does material culture . Cultural lag results when people, 
groups, organizations and social structures experience 
problems in mastering the challenges created by this lag 
(gap, or "period of maladjustment") that occurs between 
material and non-material culture .  
Commentary and a Challenge
At the time of Ogburn's death in 1959, the U . S . was 
a very different country than it is today . During the 
nearly six decades that have passed since then, this 
country has experienced significant social and cultural 
changes .  In looking at the U . S . then and now, we see 
that the country has undergone an economic and social 
transformation from being a primarily agricultural 
to an industrial to a post-industrial society .  In 1956, 
for the first time, white-collar workers outnumbered 
blue-collar workers, heralding the U . S .’s transition to 
a service economy where information has become a 
highly-valued commodity .  The country has also grown 
in geographical boundaries through the addition of 
Alaska and Hawaii as the 49th and 50th states, in 
the size of the population as well as in its racial and 
ethnic composition . Changes in the ethnic and racial 
composition of a society are social changes which 
impact on cultural changes in values, customs, beliefs, 
musical preferences, and technological developments, 
for example . Over time, social class differences in the 
U . S . have gotten more extreme especially in regard to 
the accumulation of wealth . The Wars on Poverty and 
against Drugs have both failed . Like it or not, newer 
immigrants have become important contributors to 
the growth in population size and its diversity . The 
U . S . population has been described as changing its 
complexion (e .g ., becoming more brown) .  Although 
there are still differences based on race, gender, and 
social class, on average, people in the U . S . are becoming 
older and living longer .
One wonders if Ogburn could have imagined the fast 
pace of change that would take place in the U . S . in the 
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decades after his death and some of the transformations 
that would be brought about  by technological changes 
alone . Although coined 96 years ago, cultural lag 
remains a useful concept in understanding social and 
cultural changes and periods of maladjustments in post-
modern societies including the United States . However, 
cultural lag and its consequences appear to be neglected 
areas of sociological study and publication . 
When the Editorial Board of Sociology between the 
Gaps chose the theme of cultural lag and suggested 
topics of potential interest for SBG3, we had hoped 
that this theme would produce many submissions and 
spur lively discourse on them . We had also hoped that 
some of the submissions would suggest answers to the 
problems and conflicts that cultural lags produce in 
contemporary social institutions and speculate on how 
problems and conflicts resulting from cultural lag might 
be prevented or solved . 
In the description for this volume, we included a list 
of possible topics about which potential contributors 
could write .  These topics included ways to prepare 
human beings to accept transformative innovations 
more smoothly and, thus, reduce the disruptive 
experience of cultural lag; using robots not only to 
do factory work but also in offices and as caretakers 
to the elderly and infirm;  exploring the advent, likely 
use, and consequences of autonomous (self-driving) 
cars; analyses of the effects of e-books and digital 
learning tools for reading and education; exploring 
how individuals who are not conversant in the digital 
technologies available today navigate and live in an 
increasingly digital world; and analyses of whether and 
how the spread of digital communication, including 
social media, enhances or diminishes the quality of 
people’s lives . We listed only some of the possibilities .
SBG4 and future volumes will offer contributors 
the opportunity to continue to send in submissions 
on the theme of cultural lag as well as on one of the 
other themes addressed in SBG1 (on adoption) and 
SBG2 (on livable communities) .  Potential contributors 
interested in cultural lag may choose to write about one 
of the topical areas listed in the description for SBG3 or 
another topic related to cultural lag .  The Editorial Board 
of SBG remains interested in receiving submissions on 
other topics viewed by the author(s) as neglected and/
or forgotten in mainstream sociology journals .
The success and longevity of any journal depends 
largely on the reach of its social network as well as 
on the number and quality of submissions it receives 
and accepts for publication . My challenge to readers 
is to be part of SBG’s future success by sending in a 
submission to SBG4 and to spread the word to others 
about authoring submissions to SBG . 
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       Film Review of “Robot & Frank”
 
By 
   Emily Stier Adler
“Robot & Frank” (2012) is a film set a small town in 
upstate New York in the near future .  Frank, the main 
character, is played by Frank Langella in a sympathy 
generating performance . Frank is an almost retired 
career burglar who is experiencing memory loss . 
Neither of his children lives nearby . Frank’s daughter, 
Madison, works in remote places around the world and 
keeps in touch digitally via a kind of FaceTime . His son, 
Hunter, routinely drives the five hours to his father’s 
house to deliver food and check on him . Absent but 
concerned, they keep tabs on Frank as best they can but 
are considering other residential options for him . 
The other main character in the film is the unnamed 
robot that Hunter brings for Frank to help him continue 
to live independently . Frank’s robot is a personal 
assistant robot . Another service robot in the film is Mr . 
Darcy, the “worker” in the library who does most of the 
library work . While she seems to accept the robot, the 
town librarian, played by Susan Sarandon, must cope 
with a world in which print material is being replaced 
by digital data . In fact, Frank is her only remaining 
customer as his walk to the library is one of his few 
continuing activities in addition to reading printed 
books . The film’s narrative focuses on the relationship 
that develops between Frank and his robot as well as on 
Frank’s personal and family history . 
Sociologist William Ogburn’s (1966) concept of 
cultural lag hypothesized that non-material culture 
tends to resist change or to change at a slower pace 
than material culture .  The culture is expected to adapt 
to fit new conditions and, as a result, the lag between 
the non-material and material produces challenges for 
individuals and social structures . 
 
Modernization theory, as used by gerontologists, 
has been refined to focus on aspects of material culture 
such as technology . Modernization theory specifies that 
adaptive technologies are among the environmental 
modifications that may be used by those with declining 
physical or cognitive abilities . However, the theory 
points to concerns about the “digital divide” when 
changes in technology outpace changes in nonmaterial 
dimensions (Binstock et al . 2011, p . 259) . Forced to live 
with the robot as an alternative to being placed in the 
memory care unit of a nursing home, Frank initially 
exhibits difficulties in adapting to the new technology 
because the robot interferes with his life and habits .  
We see that the cantankerous Frank is grumpy when 
his new servant, the robot, changes his diet to a healthy 
one, insists on creating daily routines including walks for 
exercise, and encourages new hobbies such as planting a 
vegetable garden . Many aspects of the depiction of the 
elderly Frank and his family are accurate . As is typical 
of the children of the elderly, Frank’s son is concerned 
about Frank’s safety and concentrates on eliminating 
risks from his father’s life . Hunter notes the messy house, 
Frank’s inability to shop and cook for himself, and his 
memory declines, like forgetting that his favorite local 
restaurant has closed, and Frank asking Hunter “How’s 
Princeton?” thinking that Hunter, near 40, is still an 
undergraduate .  
After many long trips from his house to his father’s, 
Hunter buys a robot to help Frank out . However, good 
breakfasts and a clean house are not what matter most to 
Frank . Rather, Frank’s priorities are what Atul Gawande 
(2014) argues are most important to the elderly -- 
independence and the ability to live a meaningful 
life . Only Hunter can program, or turn off, the robot . 
That fact is symbolic of Frank’s loss of independence . 
Because Frank is not the one in control of the robot, he 
has, therefore, lost control of his own life . 
However, Frank soon realizes that the robot can be 
trained to help with a series of burglaries and begins to 
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appreciate his new companion . In doing so, he learns 
to adapt to this new technology . Encouraged by the 
robot’s statement that it is not programmed to consider 
the legality of its actions, Frank decides to return to 
his former “profession .” Planning heists and then 
successfully completing them with robot’s help, Frank 
illustrates the continuity theory of successful aging . 
Continuity theory (Atchley 1989) holds that older adults 
attempt to preserve and maintain existing internal and 
external structures by using strategies tied to their past 
experiences of themselves and their social world . We see 
Frank adapt to the robot and its place in his life by using 
the robot as his burglary assistant; thereby producing 
continuity in his inner psychological characteristics 
and his social behavior . With each heist, Frank’s activity 
level and interest in the world increase which results in 
dramatic improvements in his physical and cognitive 
abilities . Viewers of this movie also observe the growing 
bond between Frank and the robot .
Estimates indicate that 5% to 7% of those over 65, 
and nearly 30% of those over 85, suffer from dementia, 
a disease characterized by progressive and generally 
irreversible loss in mental capabilities that may include 
confusion, memory loss and disorientation (Singh and 
Upadhyay 2014) . Despite his occasional confusion, 
Frank does remember how to pick a lock, case a building, 
and deactivate alarms . Such memories demonstrate 
his long term-memory still functions . However, while 
Frank clearly feels attraction to and affection for 
Jennifer, the librarian, he does not remember that she 
was his wife until they divorced 30 years before . While 
long term memory is affected by advanced dementia, 
in the beginning stages, people typically remember 
significant individuals and events in their earlier lives .
To understand the extent of the cultural gap 
concerning the use of robots, consider the data on seniors 
and technology . The most recent Pew Research Center 
report (2017) on tech adoption among older adults finds 
that they are moving towards more digitally-connected 
lives . Almost half (42%) of those over 65 now own smart 
phones up from just 18% in 2013 . Two thirds of seniors 
use the internet and half have broadband in their homes 
(Pew 2017) . However, there are important differences 
between the young old (under 75) and the oldest old 
(over 85) . Eighty two percent of those 65 to 69 go online 
while only 44% of those over 80 do; 59% of the former 
own smart phones compared to 17% of the later . Among 
the older population as a whole, the younger, relatively 
affluent and/or highly education seniors are responsible 
for the recent growth in technology adoption with 58% 
of those over 65 saying technology  has had a mostly 
positive impact on society (Pew 2017) . 
Seniors increased use of technology and their view 
that it has a positive impact on their lives may be 
indicators of the culture catching up to the technology . 
Seniors of the future may have an easier time welcoming 
robots into their homes than Frank did initially .  The 
engineers tell us that robots are here to stay and that 
their functionality is improving all the time (Clotet et . 
al 2016) . The demographics of the near future may tilt 
the ratio of caretakers from mostly human to mostly 
machine . By 2020, for the first time in history, the 
number of older people will outnumber the number of 
children younger than 5 years of age and In the next 25 
years, the number of people older than 65 will double 
(Das, 2015) . As the film’s director, Jake Schreier notes:
“From my perspective  .  .  . the question is not ‘human 
or machine?’ It’s ‘nothing or machine .’ I visited my 
grandmother, who has Alzheimer’s, maybe twice in the 
past three years . I’m not there . My family does a much 
better job but she still lives in Florida . So if this is the way 
it’s going to go, if we’re not going to be bringing the elderly 
into our own homes any more, why not hire a robot?” 
(Shoard 2013) .
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       Film Review of "The Circle" 
 
By 
   Helmut E. Reinhardt & Josephine A. Ruggiero
Based on the 2013 book of the same name by Dave 
Eggers, the film “The Circle”(released on 4/28/17) is 
similar to a sci-fi piece with a heavy dose of reality . 
Although the viewer’s take on this movie will likely 
be affected by generational differences, there are some 
chilling moments for older viewers who were raised 
in an era where privacy was much more valued than 
it appears to be today .  This movie explores what can 
go wrong and what can go right for society in light of 
advancing technological changes, their consequences, 
and implications . The central issues “The Circle” covers 
are complete and unfettered transparency of behavior 
in a “no secrets” society where people are encouraged, 
and are willing, to give up their privacy . The complete 
invasion of privacy even extends to installing cameras 
in bathroom stalls .
Mae Holland, played by Emma Watson, is drawn into 
this circle, a working-living community based loosely on 
the Apple campus . Through a friend who works at the 
Circle, Mae is hired as a customer service representative 
there . This is a full-time job that she really wants to 
keep .  For some reason, perhaps because of her youthful 
enthusiasm, Mae attracts the attention of Eamon Bailey, 
one of the Circle’s founders, played by Tom Hanks . As 
the movie progresses, Mae becomes closer to the inner 
circle where important decisions are made .  
Movie viewers learn about a series of initiatives 
developed by the Circle . These initiatives include 
SeaChange, having cameras positioned everywhere 
even on the ocean, interlinking family history with 
medical advances and SoulSearch, a tool for finding 
both lost family and friends and locating criminals 
who have gone “off the grid .”
In the first initiative, Mae agrees to wear a camera 
during the day (similar to the movie “Truman” starring 
Jim Carrey) and let the world see her interacting with 
her co-workers and friends . Unfortunately, with good 
intentions, Mae shows the circle of friends and the 
world, a chandelier her friend, Mercer Medeiros created, 
made of antlers discarded by reindeers after the mating 
season . Comments were made by viewers who did not 
know Mercer, or how he got the deer antlers, that he was 
an animal killer . Another downside of having cameras 
everywhere, including in Mae’s parents’ home, was her 
inadvertent entry into her parents’ bedroom while they 
were being intimate .
All of these sound like initiatives which can have 
positive implications . However, even with a seemingly 
good idea like SoulSearch, things can and do go very 
wrong . For example, when Mae is pressed to locate 
Mercer, played by Ellar Coltrane (who has chosen to 
go off the grid to work), she agrees reluctantly to an 
experiment at the request of the audience to find him . 
Within a short period of time, Mercer, who did not 
want to be found, was located at a wooded cabin . He 
was hounded by drones, cameras, probes, and people in 
cars until he met his demise driving off a bridge .
But the main message of the film is for Mae to allow 
complete transparency of her daily routines to everyone, 
including the leaders of the Circle . However, the same 
rules about secrets do not apply to the founders . Toward 
the end of the movie, Mae reveals to the world that they 
also had dark secrets . Very telling is the statement by 
the other founder of the Circle, Tom Stenton, played 
by Patton Oswalt, to Eamon Bailey, “We’re f-----” .  The 
implication is no one is immune, not even those at the 
top . No more secrets, no more back room deals or no 
more dirty deals . 
Currently, societies (mostly the more developed 
countries with links to technology) are in the beginning 
stages of “The Circle,” but the less developed countries 
lag behind those already developed . Even Europe is 
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only about 25% “connected .” Europeans in general still 
value privacy, direct interpersonal relations, and a less, 
hectic world . For example, few of Helmut’s cousins in 
Europe have computers, cell phones, or mobile devices, 
citing cost and the “trivialization of daily life” (e .g ., got 
to know, got to ask about everything, including what I 
or you had for breakfast) . The worst downside of “The 
Circle” is the overload on everyone’s life, the complete 
encompassing of a “Knowing-Everything Society .” Even 
without our permission, others are posting private 
information about us on the internet . Whether we like 
it or not, our personal identities no longer exist . 
________________
About the Reviewers: Helmut E. Reinhardt, M . Ed, is 
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courses in social change during her four-decades long 
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This section contains items whose aim is to supplement the articles and other work published in this volume of 
Sociology between the Gaps .  We hope you enjoy reading them .
 Implications of the Transportation Revolution
This commentary is an addendum to the article 
entitled “The Advent of Autonomous Vehicles: A 
Transportation Revolution” which I published in 
this volume .  In that article I wrote about the coming 
autonomous vehicles . Here I want to comment further 
on the possible implications of these vehicles .  In my 
previous article, I mentioned that, with the increasing 
cost of autonomous vehicles, fewer vehicles will be on 
the road .  One implication is that more people will  take 
ride-sharing vehicles (i .e ., taxis, limousines, Lufft, Uber, 
for example) or enter into car-sharing ownership with 
others . With fewer vehicles, fewer parking spaces would 
be needed . Fewer parking spaces could translate into 
more useable real estate . There will be other changes 
in societies as result of the transportation revolution . 
Below I explore seven categories of possible changes 
related to innovations in transportation .
Changes in the housing industry: With autonomous 
vehicles, anyone-- even older seniors and those either 
handicapped or disabled,  can “drive” these remarkable 
innovations. Seniors can live in their own homes 
independently much longer than at present. There 
would, therefore, be less demand on independent living 
arrangements or even assisted living, if seniors can get 
medical services at home. This, in turn, would contribute 
to the development of livable, inter-dependent 
communities, e.g., seniors living together (along with 
younger people or even relatives) in a housing complex 
which provides medical and other support services. 
These livable communities would help seniors with 
social, economic, and housing issues. The proliferation 
of livable communities would, in turn, minimize the 
number and size of the independent/assisted living 
facilities throughout the country and reduce the cost to 
Medicare and Medicaid.
 
Another proposal to change the housing industry is 
the existence of autonomous houses . According to Doug 
Davis, senior VP of Intel’s Automated Driving Group, 
people could see “an evolution of RV’s into autonomous 
houses and nomadic communities that follow work 
patterns .”1 This brave new world of the future would 
become a truly mobile one . With the need of labor being 
sent to do specific jobs in other parts of a country, the 
demographics of nations would shift dramatically . For 
example, if the Las Vegas area needs more laborers or 
employees for business, then these mobile communities 
would be summoned to fulfill the labor need . 
Changes in city/large town planning: In a sort 
of return to the past in the future, large metropolises 
could become decentralized into smaller manageable, 
self-sustaining entities with all the necessary services 
to be self-sufficient . For example, these smaller entities 
would have local  pharmacies, doctor and lawyer offices, 
butchers, shoemakers, tailors, corner grocery stores, 
crafts people and other specialty trades .
Small forgotten and abandoned towns throughout 
the country could be repurposed into self-sustaining 
communities . Larger cities, like New York City, for 
example, would be broken into five boroughs, each 
operating independently . Residents would use either 
mass transportation or autonomous vehicles for distance 
travel to surrounding communities . I wrote about this 
model in SBG2 in the article entitled, “Reinforcing The 
Values of The Village In Urban Settings .” 
Changes in occupations: Gone will be truck drivers, 
since the trucking industry will be managed by driverless 
vehicles . These vehicles, in turn, would be dispatched 
by computers not humans . The trucking industry 
will have to re-invent itself into a kind of an Amazon 
1What’s the Autonomy Economy? 2017 . Car and Driver (No-
vember: 088) .
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organization . Fleets of trucks can be used for cross-
country commerce and would be segregated from non-
commercial autonomous vehicles . These robo-trucks 
would operate day or night . Some federal regulation 
must be made for hours of operation and could operate 
on alternative fuels, such as natural gas .  
Occupations yet to be determined will emerge, mostly 
in the IT field .  Occupations displaced by autonomous 
vehicles or by computers may become a new class of 
"unemployables ."  This category could be short-term or 
long-term depending on the opportunities to learn new 
skills such as starting a small business or becoming part 
of a cooperative .  In either case, people “in transition” to 
a new occupation or career should likely be paid more 
than people on welfare . 
Changes in secondary and post-secondary 
education:  Vocational high schools will become more 
useful for the general population in training students 
for computer technology and repair and for various 
trades . With the innovation of autonomous vehicles, 
auto mechanics will be a highly specialized  and skilled 
field . Autonomous vehicles will become computers 
on wheels . In the future, autonomous vehicles may be 
able to self-diagnose glitches and problems, such as 
viruses .  Gone will be the corner Mom and Pop garage . 
Thus, human technicians may even become obsolete . 
Because of the higher level skill sets required, children 
may start a form of regular public schooling sooner than 
they do at present-- at age three rather than at age five . 
Instructors at all educational levels would need to be re-
trained to fit the needs of the advanced technologies . 
Also, studying the liberal arts in colleges would be 
a luxury reserved for the wealthy like the finishing 
schools of the past and for those older adults who have 
the desire to learn these enrichment subjects and have 
leisure time at their disposal . Colleges and universities 
would shift to specialized fields, such as pre-law, pre-
med, and business and finance .
Changes in alternative energy sources: Vehicles of 
the future will be running on natural gas, non-petro 
oils, electric, even solar or fuel-cell . The environment 
would become cleaner . Dependency on fossil fuels will 
be a thing of the past, because fossil fuels will not be 
used for the operation of autonomous vehicles and 
more for maintenance of these vehicles . There is also 
the possibility of a low-grade, nuclear-fueled vehicle, 
such as the vehicle in the movies, “Back to the Future, 
Part II and III .” Flying locomotives, however, such as in 
the movie, “Back to the Future, Part III,” can be a bit of 
stretch of our imagination .  Flying cars, fueled on fuel-
cells or other alternative energies, will be here in 2020, 
but changes in FAA regulations will likely lag behind for 
many years . I also think  new occupations may emerge 
in time from the development of these alternative 
energies .  
Changes in vehicle size: Vehicles would become 
smaller and more compact . Autos without drivers 
could carry two to six people; buses would be smaller, 
similar to mini vans; and trucks can be either very large 
(similar to the present day “trains” of Australia, which 
criss-cross the continent through the Outback) or 
small “robotrucks .” These driverless vehicle “would re-
program the time/cost optimization of travel” and thus, 
would eliminate regional air travel . A businessman could 
use an autonomous vehicle instead of air shuttles to go 
to a distant city and spend productive time working in 
these vehicles while traveling  or catching up on sleep or 
just socializing with fellow passengers .2
  
Businesses would have their own autonomous fleet 
vehicles to deliver their goods, thus eliminating some 
delivery companies, such as FedEx . Companies, like 
United States Postal Service, may have to change their 
focus to accommodate their delivery of goods and 
services . Competition from drone-based companies 
may also be a big concern . 
Changes in the legal profession and in policing: 
Autonomous vehicles are controlled by computers, 
sensors, and radar .  Thus, vehicles will not go over speed 
limits, drive recklessly, make judgment errors, text or 
interfere with regulations of the road . The legal field 
may shift in focus to liability issues . What happens if 
there is an accident due to glitches or problems with the 
computers within these vehicles? The manufacturers 
of these autonomous vehicles must insure themselves 
against claims . There would also be a shift in policing on 
the road . Police, both local and state, would concentrate 
on crimes and not to police roadway violations, such 
as distracted driving, regulation violations, and road 
rage . No more state or local police hiding behind signs 
or bridges . 
2How Would Level 5 Cars Change Our Lives? 2017 . Car and 
Driver (November: 085) .
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In conclusion, the transportation revolution will 
have a far-reaching effect on our world in the very near 
future . From the housing industry to the educational 
field; from the trucking industry to the business world, 
our way of life will be changed dramatically .  We must 
adapt to the challenges of these changes with changes 
in the sphere of non-material culture .  New regulations 
and laws will need to be created to accommodate our 
ever changing world . 
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Driving into the Future
Many companies are getting on the bandwagon of 
mass producing autonomous vehicles. As recently 
as December 2017, a number of big and small 
manufacturing companies have started to unveil plans 
to produce autonomous vehicles with, and without, 
steering wheels and pedals. 
By 2019, Ford Motor Company, one of the oldest 
car  manufacturers in America, will unveil plans for 
an autonomous vehicle, which “talks” to everything-
-e.g., street lights, smart phones (in the pockets of 
pedestrians and bicyclists), other non-autonomous 
and semi-autonomous vehicles. When this happens, 
transportation will start to take a leap into the future. 
Ford is actively pursuing several other initiatives 
partnering with Qualcomm to install a V2X cellular 
technology into its vehicles;  with Domino’s and Lyfft; 
and with a delivery startup company called Postmates . 
The objective of the Ford Motor Company is to make 
money off of the idea of driver-less vehicles . In addition, 
by 2021, Ford plans to manufacture a vehicle without 
either a steering wheel or gas and brake pedals (Hawkins 
2018a) . 
General Motors, once the largest automobile 
company in the world, also plans to introduce an 
autonomous vehicle without a steering wheel or pedals . 
Using fourth-generation electric Chevrolet Bolts, the 
primary use of this vehicle will be for ride-sharing and 
a taxi service . Currently, third-generation Bolts are 
being used on a trial basis on streets of San Francisco 
and Phoenix . The trial basis has been deemed fairly 
successful, with only six crashes in September 2017 
(both fault and no fault by these vehicles) .  GM was able 
to roll out this innovation because of their acquisition 
of Cruise Automation and LIDAR start-up Strobe . 
With innovations coming rapidly to various car shows 
(traditional roll-out of forthcoming models), the federal 
government finds itself in a state of cultural lag because 
many of these new vehicles do not meet federal safety 
standards . For example, because of the lack of steering 
controls, a passenger airbag must be substituted for the 
driver airbag on these new GM ride-sharing vehicles . 
GM needs to seek exemptions from the Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards in order to be able to even 
road-test these new vehicles (Hawkins 2018b) .
Waymo, self-driving unit of Google Alphabet, will 
also launch their first commercial driver-less, ride-
sharing service in Phoenix, AZ, but with a steering wheel 
and pedals (for emergency or backup use) . According 
to Hawkins (2018c), Waymo is also test-driving these 
minivans in San Francisco and Atlanta . Waymo has 
announced that they have already tested these vans in 
24 cities throughout the country, including Austin, TX, 
Detroit, MI, and Kirkland, WA . 
In Las Vegas, a Mercedes Smart Vision EQ is making 
its appearance . This vehicle has a different approach . 
Achieving a top speed of 12 mph, the Mercedes Smart 
Vision EQ has room for just passengers . It is piloted 
remotely by a nearby human . Since there is no center 
console and steering controls, the vehicle’s interior is 
roomy . The dashboard has navigation and a few social 
media posts to entertain passengers . The vehicle has a 
“kill-switch” in case something goes wrong (O’Kane 
2018) .
The Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in Las Vegas 
has showcased a Toyota with an E-Palette concept which 
makes it essentially a box on wheels . These vehicles can 
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be transformed to suit the needs of the company that 
buys them . Amazon or FedEx may turn it into a delivery 
vehicle . A flower shop may use the vehicle to transport 
flowers . This “concept vehicle” is next-generation battery-
electric and is fully autonomous (Nichol 2018) .
Voyage, a startup company, is introducing self-
driving taxis to the Villages retirement community in 
Orlando, FL (Hawkins 2018d) . These taxis will have 
traditional controls . Voyage has operated the same self-
driving vehicles in the San Jose, CA Villages community 
and is offering senior citizens in San Jose and Orlando 
an equity stake in the Voyage company as a bonus 
for participating in the experiment . Determining the 
effectiveness of this incentive with senior citizens will 
require further research .
Lastly, self-driving taxis, operated by Lyfft and Aptiv, 
will extend their trial period in Las Vegas . Lyfft is 
working on a program for Boston . As demonstrated in 
the 2018 Consumer Electronic Show (CES), these taxis 
provided the show attendees tickets for free rides of up 
to 400 miles of transportation to 20 pre-programmed 
destinations throughout the Las Vegas area . The rating 
of 4 .5+ (out of 5) from attendees who took the free 
rides is very positive feedback . In my opinion, the 
CES illustrated the rapid pace of innovations in the 
autonomous vehicle realm . Government regulations 
have not kept pace . If regulations do not catch up with 
the pace of change, there is the risk that this lag will 
hinder more technological changes now and in the 
future .
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